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The Missing Regulatory State:
Monitoring Businesses in an Age of
Surveillance
Rory Van Loo*
An irony of the information age is that the companies responsible for
the most extensive surveillance of individuals in history—large platforms such
as Amazon, Facebook, and Google—have themselves remained unusually
shielded from being monitored by government regulators. But the legal
literature on state information acquisition is dominated by the privacy problems
of excess collection from individuals, not businesses. There has been little
sustained attention to the problem of insufficient information collection from
businesses. This Article articulates the administrative state’s normative
framework for monitoring businesses and shows how that framework is
increasingly in tension with privacy concerns. One emerging complication is the
perception that the state, through agencies such as the National Security
Administration, deploys large technology companies to surveil individuals. As
a result, any routine regulatory monitoring of platforms—even for the purpose
of prosecuting those platforms—would implicate an overbearing state peering
into our personal lives. Moreover, opponents of regulation have weaponized
privacy arguments to shield other businesses from monitoring, such as banks.
A sharper understanding of the institutional, legal, and informational
differences between regulatory monitoring and personal surveillance is needed.
Juxtaposing these two state tools reveals that the tension between regulation
and privacy is largely illusory. Regulators today—most notably the Federal
Trade Commission—have untapped power to monitor emerging risks in big
technology and other sectors. They should not hesitate to use that power to
pursue a more informed and collaborative path to achieving their missions.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Information is the “lifeblood” of effective governance.1 In the
wake of major crises throughout history—bank failures that threatened
the North’s ability to fund the Civil War, oil spills that contaminated
American coastlines, or muckrakers’ exposés of vermin-infested
meatpacking facilities—Congress has repeatedly responded by giving
agencies monitoring authority, which is the power to subject businesses
to routine on-site inspections or examination of private records.2
Once deployed, monitoring authority can have a powerful
impact. For instance, increasing the average number of Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) inspections of factories was found to have
reduced the pollutants that reach nearby neighborhoods—the type of
pollution that is believed to significantly increase the incidence of
dementia and premature death—by 2.7 percent.3 Regulatory
examinations make banks less likely to engage in risky behavior that
could collapse the financial system.4 Monitoring also facilitates more
predictable and collaborative regulation by providing a mechanism for
regular dialogue between industry and government.5 Few projects are
1.
See Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 277 (2004) (“Information is the lifeblood of regulatory
policy.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REV. 253, 259
(1986) (“[I]nformation is the lifeblood of a regulatory agency . . . .”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1423 (2011) (making “the
commonplace observation—so obvious that it ought to be uncontroversial—that many public decisions turn on some form of predictive judgment, such that a decisionmaker’s choice does and should
depend on the quality and content of the information available to her”).
2.
See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 371 (2019) (providing a history of regulatory monitoring). Regulatory crises
prompt diverse policies beyond monitoring. See POLICY SHOCK: RECALIBRATING RISK AND
REGULATION AFTER OIL SPILLS, NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 5–11 (Edward J. Balleisen, Lori S. Bennear, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 2017).
3.
Jinghui Lim, The Impact of Monitoring and Enforcement on Air Pollutant Emissions, 49
J. REG. ECON. 203, 204 (2016).
4.
See, e.g., John Kandrac & Bernd Schlusche, The Effect of Bank Supervision on Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series,
Working Paper No. 79, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2938039
[https://perma.cc/G4AA-X6E9].
5.
See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 397–98 (arguing that regulatory monitoring fits well with
new governance models because it is less adversarial than enforcement lawsuits). On new governance emphasizing collaboration and responsiveness, see, for example, IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4–7 (1992);
COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY (2006); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); and Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342
(2004). On applying collaborative governance to technology firms, see, for example, Margot E. Kaminski, When the Default is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the NTIA, 94 DENV. L. REV. 923,
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more crucial for the regulatory state than establishing sufficient
information flow to enforce laws.
Despite the importance of consistent regulatory access to
nonpublic information, regulators often lack visibility into business
activities.6 Most notably today, federal regulators do not regularly
monitor the companies that run platforms, defined as sites “where
interactions are materially and algorithmically intermediated.”7 Recent
events have provoked bipartisan anxiety about the manipulation of U.S.
presidential elections through Twitter and Facebook;8 exposure of user
data at companies such as Uber and Yahoo;9 and the anticompetitive
implications of Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft for small
businesses and consumers.10 Yet these companies go to extremes to
keep their inner workings secret.11
A growing chorus of scholars have proposed regulatory
monitoring of private algorithms and online platforms.12 Because those
939 (2017); William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 983
(2016); and David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 373 (2014).
6.
See infra Part I.A (reviewing which regulators monitor).
7.
Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 136 (2017)
(including as platforms “online marketplaces, desktop and mobile computing environments, social
networks, virtual labor exchanges, payment systems, [and] trading systems”).
8.
See Matt Apuzzo & Sharon LaFraniere, Indictment Bares Russian Network to Twist 2016
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2018, at A1.
9.
See, e.g., Mike Isaac et al., Uber Breach, Kept Secret for a Year, Hit 57 Million Accounts,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2017, at B1; Ryan Knutson & Robert McMillan, Yahoo Hack Swells to 3 Billion Accounts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2017, at A1.
10. Cf. European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-171784_en.htm [https://perma.cc/YE5Q-6RCN] [hereinafter Commission Fines Google].
11. See infra Section II.B.
12. See, e.g., Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1662–86 (2017) (drawing on Rory Van Loo’s Helping Buyers Beware to discuss the need for agencies to “detect” wrongdoing in the sharing economy); Danielle
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89
WASH. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2014) (proposing that the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) audit consumer scoring systems); Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 372–73 (2016) (“[P]olicymakers must devise ways of enabling regulators to evaluate algorithmically-embedded controls . . . .”); Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll,
Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16–17 (2017) (discussing how to make algorithms able to be audited by regulators); Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW.
U. L. REV. 105, 169–71 (2010) (calling for monitoring of search engines and considering the possibility of the FTC playing that role); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116
MICH. L. REV. 421, 464 (2017) (calling for greater scrutiny of medical algorithms by the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) and third parties); Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government
Administration: The Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
1321, (1992) (calling for “independent governmental monitoring of data processing systems”); Rory
Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311,
1382 (2015) (proposing that the FTC monitor Amazon); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K. Hallisey,
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proposals are typically made in passing as part of broader discussions
about technology governance, they address neither the regulatory
state’s legal foundation nor its normative framework for compelling
private parties to hand over nonpublic information. Administrative law
scholarship, which would be a plausible source for such a framework,
has produced relevant insights into regulators’ tools and motivations
for information collection.13 But the legal and normative questions
surrounding state compulsion of private parties to hand over
information, even for administrative searches of businesses, have been
dominated instead by a vast scholarship on privacy and criminal
surveillance.14 The animating problem in that scholarship, and in the
privacy literature more broadly, is how to restrict excess information
collection.15
“Equality and Privacy by Design”: A New Model of Artificial Intelligence Data Transparency via
Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428, 429 (2019) (proposing “an auditing regime and a certification program, run either by a governmental body or, in the
absence of such entity, by private institutions”); see also Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data
and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93,
121–24 (2014) (considering auditing by public agencies to address predictive privacy harms).
13. Administrative law scholars’ insights into agencies’ techniques, organizational design,
and incentives for collecting adequate information provide valuable foundations, but do not address the focus of this Article: the legal framework and normative considerations justifying monitoring authority to compel businesses to provide nonpublic information to regulators. See, e.g.,
Coglianese et al., supra note 1, at 324–25 (focusing on regulatory incentives to pursue voluntary
information collection for policymaking); Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure
and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574, 650–54 (2012) (suggesting institutional improvements for regulatory inspectors); Stephenson, supra note 1, at 1483 (identifying legal-institutional
design choices for incentivizing information gathering).
14. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 246 (2017)
(identifying surveillance concerns and the misuse of administrative subpoenas); Orin S. Kerr,
Searches and Seizures in A Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 533 (2005) (“This Article develops a normative framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to searches of computer hard
drives and other electronic storage devices.”); Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative
Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 261–62 (2011) (examining inspections of businesses and other
administrative searches and situating “the dilution of Fourth Amendment rights in the administrative search context within the larger story of diminishing criminal procedure rights . . . .”);
Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 92–95 (2016) (drawing on
the Supreme Court’s regulatory inspection decisions to illuminate the Fourth Amendment and
policing); see also infra Section IV.C (situating monitoring within the literature on surveillance
and privacy).
15. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance,
105 CALIF. L. REV. 735 (2017) (analyzing how the law can delineate boundaries for worker surveillance); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative
Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 76 (2008) (assessing the efficacy of agency privacy impact assessments); G.S. Hans, Curing Administrative Search Decay, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 2–3 (2018)
(“This Article focuses on the role of regulatory agencies in the collection of user data from private
businesses. It argues that the government should not be able to so easily collect sensitive information without a warrant, active oversight, or robust limitations.”); James Q. Whitman, The Two
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1153, (2004) (“It is a
commonplace, moreover, that our privacy is peculiarly menaced by the evolution of modern society,
with its burgeoning technologies of surveillance and inquiry.”); Andrew McCanse Wright, Civil
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This Article builds on that literature to examine the opposite
problem: insufficient information collection. It offers a framework for
why lawmakers have pervasively granted collection authority to
agencies and develops that framework through a case study of online
platforms. To comprehend the inattention and resistance to monitoring
platforms,16 and more broadly, how the norms for monitoring
businesses are evolving in the twenty-first century, it is necessary to
broaden the doctrinal and administrative lens to include agencies that
at first seem unrelated to regulatory monitoring: the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”), National Security Administration (“NSA”), U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and other federal and
local agencies that are primarily concerned with crime and national
security. For ease of exposition, these agencies are referred to below as
“crime agencies” to contrast them with “regulators,” which focus on
enforcing civil laws against businesses, although important distinctions
exist within each category and both types of agencies can play a role in
enforcing diverse laws.17
The literature on crime surveillance has remained mostly
disconnected from that on regulatory monitoring.18 Crime agencies
often engage in surveillance, defined in the surveillance studies
literature as “the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal
details.”19 Most prominently, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
intelligence agencies built databases that enabled them to conduct
warrantless computer scans of the metadata from most U.S. citizens’
email, phone, and internet records.20 Regulators, unlike crime agencies,

Society and Cybersurveillance, 70 ARK. L. REV. 745, 745 (2017) (“There is no such thing as benign
surveillance.”); sources cited supra note 14.
16. Some observers in favor of regulating tech prefer public disclosures or an ex post, litigation-oriented approach. The reasons for the hostility include concerns about the independent spirit
of the internet, a lack of regulatory sophistication, and the possibility that heavier regulation
would
stifle
innovation.
See
infra
Section
II.C;
see
also
Lawrence B. Solum, Models of Internet Governance, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE
AND INSTITUTIONS 48, 57–58 (2009) (discussing early resistance to internet regulation).
17. Criminal law and national security law are two distinct bodies that primarily pursue the
punishment of incarceration. When regulators identify criminal wrongdoing in the course of their
affairs, they may then refer the matter to other agencies for prosecution. See infra Section III.B.
Although the terms elide major differences within each category worthy of study, they facilitate
the exposition and examination of broader themes crucial to understanding monitoring.
18. See, e.g., DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 17–21 (2007) (providing a review of surveillance studies without mentioning regulatory monitoring). But see Robert A. Mikos, Can the
States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2012); Slobogin, supra
note 14.
19. LYON, supra note 18, at 14.
20. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 14, at 107 (“[T]he federal government at one time routinely
swept up virtually everyone’s ‘metadata’—the identifying information about our communications—and may well have collected (and continued to collect) much more than that.”).
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do not have a history of personal surveillance provoking public outcry.
Yet scholars and judges routinely use “surveillance” to refer to
regulatory monitoring of businesses.21 In addition, the same clause of
the Fourth Amendment and section of the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”) govern each type of information collection.22 Above all,
privacy concerns have shaped both underlying legal frameworks since
colonial times.23 Regulatory monitoring and crime surveillance thus
share close conceptual and legal ties.
The conflation of these two distinct administrative activities is
problematic in underappreciated ways. The pervasiveness of
technological surveillance “has helped spark an anti-surveillance,
proprivacy movement that extends across legal scholarship, policy
debates, civil rights advocacy, political discourse, and public
consciousness.”24 The salience of this controversy complicates the
regulatory monitoring of platforms because crime agencies use
technology firms as “the real data-mining masterminds” of their
surveillance.25 When one of the most pressing concerns among the
populace and leading jurists is the state accessing information about
individuals through technology companies, regulatory monitoring of
those companies is easily confused with inviting the state to invade our
privacy.26 Accordingly, accusations of endangering personal privacy
have put regulators on the defensive, even at one point shutting down
vital Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) regulatory
information collection.27 At the extreme, privacy may even follow a
21. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 21 (2007) (referring to regulation
of national banks as “audits and surveillance”); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
229, 252 (1986) (discussing the EPA’s warrantless “surveillance” of businesses); Woodrow Hartzog
& Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2015)
(noting that “the language and framing used in surveillance debate is diverse, inconsistent, and
over-generalized”); Price, supra note 12, at 462–65 (using surveillance and monitoring to describe
FDA oversight of medical devices). To facilitate exposition, this Article refers to regulators’ information collection as monitoring and to crime agencies’ as surveillance, but surveillance and monitoring can be used interchangeably.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (regulating searches and seizures); Administrative Procedure
Act § 6, 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (2012) (governing “investigative acts”).
23. See infra Sections I.C.1. and III.A.
24. Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 426 (2017).
25. Nancy S. Kim & D. A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-Governmental Actors
and the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 723 (2015); see also Samuel J. Rascoff,
Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 662 (2016) (“A critically important . . . feature of
the new intelligence oversight ecosystem is the role of American technology and telecommunications firms.”); David C. Vladeck, Consumer Protection in an Era of Big Data Analytics, 42 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 493, 498 (2016) (“[T]here is little question that the major data brokers know more
about each of us than say, for example, the National Security Agency, the Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration, or any other governmental institution.”).
26. See infra Section IV.C.
27. See infra Section IV.C.
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trajectory seen with transparency and free speech: moving from a tool
deployed by those engaged in state-building to a tool deployed by
antistatists seeking to obstruct regulation.28
The conceptual association of regulatory monitoring and crime
surveillance obscures important institutional and informational
differences. Regulators target information about businesses, while
crime agencies target personal information.29 Moreover, throughout
history public outcry has often driven Congress to force regulators to
use more of the monitoring authority they already had, while scandals
have prompted Congress to do the opposite with crime agencies—to
restrict their surveillance activities.30 Outside of crises, however,
lawmakers have passed important laws such as the APA without
distinguishing between agencies—thereby potentially restricting
business regulators through legislation meant to respond to unease
about crime agencies.31 By overlooking the significant differences
between crime agencies and regulators, the legal framework may
inadvertently hinder regulators that instead need encouragement to
collect adequate information.32
This Article’s main contributions are to illuminate the legal
framework for monitoring businesses and to show how that vital
enforcement tool is hindered by operating in the shadow of widely
maligned personal surveillance.33 These insights also have important
28. On the link between privacy origins and state-building, see Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping
Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553,
565 (2007) (tracing privacy origins not to the Constitution but to the early Post Office and “those
who sought independence”); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2014) (arguing that that “[p]rogressive lawyers within
the executive branch took the lead in forging a new civil-libertarian consensus and that they did
so to strengthen rather than to circumscribe the administrative state,” and mentioning privacy as
historically analogous to civil liberties). For arguments that transparency and free speech have
served deregulatory agendas, see, for example, David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift,
128 YALE L.J. 100, 102 (2018) (arguing that transparency serves to “reduce other forms of regulation”); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 133 (2016) (“Once the mainstay
of political liberty, the First Amendment has emerged as a powerful deregulatory engine . . . .”).
29. See infra Section III.B.1.
30. See infra Section III.B.1.
31. See infra Section III.B.1.
32. Scholars have concluded that agency overzealousness varies, and as a result, oversight
mechanisms designed to check overzealous bureaucrats ignore important agency heterogeneity.
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1262 (2006) (arguing that “the claim that agencies are systematically biased
in a proregulatory direction finds little support in public choice theory, the political science literature, or elsewhere”); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1354–55 (2013) (“There is no compelling argument that agencies will be more inclined to overreach than underperform . . . .).
33. Scholars have discussed a distinct but related tension between the need to protect trade
secrets and the need to regulate businesses. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY:
THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 163–64 (2016).
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policy implications across the regulatory state, including for the
primary regulator of platforms, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”).34 The newly appointed FTC commissioners have expressed an
interest in greater oversight of platforms.35 Yet the agency does not
monitor businesses, except in limited contexts currently required by
law.36 In early 2019, nine months after an early draft of this Article was
circulated at a conference attended by FTC officials, the agency
announced a task force to monitor technology companies.37 However,
the task force is focused on competition—which leaves out consumer
protection and privacy—and it is unclear how far the group will move
beyond the FTC’s traditional light-touch, ex post information collection
approach.38 This Article concludes that the FTC’s authorizing statute,
when viewed in the context of judicial precedent and the normative
foundations for monitoring, indicates that the FTC could—without any
congressional action—monitor businesses far more extensively than it
traditionally has.39 FTC monitoring of the surveillance economy would
bring the regulatory governance of the world’s most valuable industry
more in line with that of other large industries.
The issues facing regulatory monitoring of platforms portend
larger tensions building for regulatory monitoring in the surveillance
era. Other agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”), likely sit on similar untapped authority.40 Companies ranging
from Citibank to Target to American Airlines increasingly amass
customers’ personal data and connect with platforms—thereby
producing harms similar to those that platforms produce.
34. The FTC regulates online platforms for antitrust, privacy, and consumer protection. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
35. Diane Bartz, FTC Nominees Open to Tech Probes, Concerned About High Drug Prices,
REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2018, 1:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ftc-congress/ftc-nominees-open-to-tech-probes-concerned-about-high-drug-prices-idUSKCN1FY2RN
[https://perma.cc/4QHW-XGY3].
36. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (requiring pre-merger notification).
37. See 2018 Privacy Law Scholars Conference, BERKELEY L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/research/bclt/bcltevents/2018annual-privacy-law-scholars-conference (last visited Sept.
22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2FJ3-8WN5] (listing Joseph Calandrino and Kevin Moriarty as attending the May 30–31 conference in Washington, D.C.); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC’s
Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to Monitor Technology Markets (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/02/ftcs-bureau-competition-launches-taskforce-monitor-technology [https://perma.cc/6ZKJ-5H26] (“Agency dedicates resources exclusively
towards monitoring competition in the tech industry and taking enforcement actions when warranted.”). This Article was also workshopped at the Georgetown Technology Law and Policy Colloquium, and received input from a former FTC high-ranking official, ten months before the announcement of the task force. Since the Article was mostly researched, workshopped, and
submitted before that task force’s launch, it does not include an examination of that new group.
38. See infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
39. See infra Section IV.A.
40. See infra Section IV.B.
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Congressional leaders have also weighed legislation for auditing
algorithms in select contexts, such as for discrimination.41 For these and
related issues, it would be ideal for agency leaders, judges, and
lawmakers, in deciding whether to monitor, to consider the context of
the modern regulatory state’s legal and normative framework for that
authority.
If the monitoring framework is to be updated for the surveillance
era, there is a risk in moving where prominent privacy warnings seem
to naturally direct it—away from monitoring due to unease about
regulators collecting customer data. Legitimate privacy concerns do not
demand the complete avoidance of monitoring because they can be
addressed through the design of monitoring programs and through
legal constraints.42 In fact, what the surveillance era may call for—at
least to prevent some types of harms—is more government monitoring
of businesses.43 Among other reasons, monitoring can help regulators
determine whether businesses are safeguarding customers’ data.44
Clarifying the normative and legal framework for regulatory
monitoring also helps sketch a blueprint for an improved
administrative information architecture. Instead of restricting crime
agencies and business regulators in the same way, as the APA and other
statutes do, legislators should tailor restrictions to the divergent
informational dynamics of each of those categories of agencies.45
Greater attention to the fine distinctions between regulators and crime
agencies, and the purposes of their information collection, would help
reset the state informational framework to its constitutional roots by
prioritizing personal privacy over business privacy.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I examines the
historical record to identify the factors considered in congressional

41. James A. Allen, The Color of Algorithms: An Analysis and Proposed Research Agenda for
Deterring Algorithmic Redlining, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 219, 260 (2019) (discussing a congressional hearing on oversight of algorithms).
42. See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 15 (identifying mechanisms for increasing agencies’ privacy accountability); Hans, supra note 15, at 34 (discussing the need for limitations in
regulatory programs that collect data); infra Section III.B.
43. This assumes that the government continues to reflect democratic values, or that the
monitor has appropriate constraints in place should that fail to be the case. Nor does it completely
preclude private monitoring regimes, although purely private regimes may have limits. See infra
Part II.C.
44. See infra Section III.A. Although he did not discuss business monitoring, the competing
privacy interests between business owners and users is arguably an example of what David Pozen
has described as a “privacy-privacy tradeoff.” Cf. David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. 221, 221 (2016) (“Whenever securing privacy on one margin compromises privacy on
another margin, a privacy-privacy tradeoff arises.”). By analogy, this Article develops a privacyregulation tradeoff.
45. See infra Section III.B.
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extension and judicial approval of regulatory monitoring authority.
Part II begins a case study of platforms by applying the three factors
weighing in favor of monitoring: a public interest in preventing harm,
information asymmetries, and self-regulatory shortcomings. Part III
explains the two main factors historically weighing against monitoring,
privacy and burden, and considers how they are changing in the
surveillance era. Part IV concludes by examining legal and theoretical
implications. It analyzes the scope of the FTC’s dormant statutory
monitoring authority, and briefly considers possible action by other
agencies, such as the FCC and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). Both agency discretion and statutory design
would benefit from a normative framework that more clearly
demarcates the actors, targets, and content of monitoring from those of
surveillance. The overarching goal is to contribute to an administrative
structure that ensures regulators in the future, like crime agencies
today, have the information they need to make informed decisions.
I. RATIONALE FOR REGULATORY MONITORING
Despite strong countervailing interests in privacy and autonomy
at the founding of the country, regulators have steadily gained the
authority to peer inside businesses to promote legal compliance. The
legal literature lacks any holistic analysis of the considerations that
legislators and judges weighed in elevating regulatory monitoring
authority to a central role in policing firms. This Part begins to fill that
gap by surveying the factors historically weighed in extending
monitoring authority. The rest of the Article then develops this
framework in the context of the platform economy and the surveillance
state.46
A. Overview of Regulatory Monitoring
This Article is focused on administrative agencies’ “systematic
and routine” collection of nonpublic information, rather than one-off
investigations.47 The state has in recent decades increasingly relied on
such “programmatic” information for enforcing criminal laws, ranging
46. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson conceived of the National Surveillance State as a new
form of governance responding “to the particular needs of warfare, foreign policy, and domestic
law enforcement in the twenty-first century.” See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 489 (2006). But see Orin S. Kerr, The National Surveillance State: A
Response to Balkin, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2180 (2009) (arguing that the National Surveillance
State is more about technological change than a new form of governance).
47. Slobogin, supra note 14, at 93.
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from roadside checkpoints to call record databases.48 Routine business
monitoring also has steadily grown to become one of the regulatory
state’s core powers.49
At first glance, the work of front-line bureaucrats who monitor
may seem mundane: poring over financial records to identify risky bank
transactions, inspecting poultry for signs of contamination, or assessing
the pollution controls in factories.50 But like police officers, regulatory
monitors make life-altering decisions about when and how the law will
be enforced and against whom.51 They are often scientists, economists,
and engineers with the power to obligate companies to pay millions to
their customers in redress, block hazardous food products from reaching
Americans’ dinner tables, or shut down offshore oil rigs.52 Whereas legal
scholars universally recognize that law enforcement officers wield
considerable authority in federal criminal law, the role of their civil law
counterparts—regulatory monitors—is overlooked.53
For present purposes, regulatory monitoring is the collection of
information that the agency can force a business to provide even
without suspecting a particular act of wrongdoing. The two main
categories of monitoring are remote report collection and on-site visits.
The scope of information accessible to on-site inspectors depends on
their mandate. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and EPA
inspectors, for instance, can access records related to their missions—
food safety and the environment—but cannot examine records about
profit.54 Bank examiners, in contrast, can access almost any piece of
data because their mission is broad.55 These visits may occur with
advanced notice or unannounced, as when oil inspectors drop in via
48. Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1039, 1042 (2016) (“While our Fourth Amendment framework is transactional, then, surveillance
is increasingly programmatic.”); see also Slobogin, supra note 14, at 93:
Panvasive searches and seizures . . . seek to ferret out or deter undetected wrongdoing . . . rather than focus on a particular crime known to have already occurred; . . . they are purposefully suspicionless with respect to any particular individual, and thus will almost inevitably affect a significant number of people not involved
in wrongdoing.
49. Van Loo, supra note 2, at 373 (describing the regulatory state’s pervasive reliance on
ongoing monitoring); cf. MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT EXPLOSION (1994) (describing the growth of
audits by private and public actors in the United Kingdom).
50. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 372–73.
51. Id. at 373.
52. Id. at 373–74.
53. Id.
54. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 372, 21 U.S.C. § 372 (2012).
55. See John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before a Conference on
Credit Rating and Scoring Models (May 17, 2004), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2004/pub-speech-2004-36.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8UM-A547].
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helicopter on Gulf of Mexico oil platforms to check safety and
environmental compliance.56 For some companies, such as the largest
banks and nuclear facilities, regulators have resident monitors on site
year-round.
Even agencies with on-site inspection authority typically
supplement those efforts with heavy remote monitoring. These can
occur through one-off requests to answer specific questions (such as
asking to clarify a new technology used), whenever a specific event
occurs (such as a proposed merger), or on a periodic basis (such as
monthly reports on bank lending activities). Agencies also sometimes
use legal authority to install remote-monitoring devices, such as
sensors measuring equipment inside a manufacturing facility.57 Once
these reports or data sets are in place, analysts within the regulator
conduct spot-check audits, algorithmically driven systemic reviews, or
other checks to identify violations.
Monitors respond to violations in different ways depending on
the agency. Banking monitors, called “examiners,” typically have the
independence to decide how to resolve the violation.58 For instance,
CFPB examiners have required banks to make multimillion dollar
payments without an enforcement lawyer playing a substantial role.59
Due to banks’ fears of creating an antagonistic relationship, and the
examiners’ ability to pass a matter on to enforcement lawyers for formal
legal proceedings, the examiners have substantial leverage in making
informal demands.60 The EPA, in contrast, has a more integrated
approach. Once the EPA inspector—typically an engineer—identifies
anything more than a minor violation, she works side by side with a
lawyer to seek redress, even coauthoring court briefs.61
Of the nineteen large federal regulators of business, only four
rely more heavily on lawyers than monitors.62 Notably, the two agencies
that are arguably the most important for overseeing the surveillance
economy are among these four that do not rely heavily on monitoring:
the FTC, which is the agency with the most regulatory authority over
platforms, and the FCC, which oversees other important information
56. See Guy Hayes, A Day in the Life of an Inspector, BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENF’T,
https://www.bsee.gov/newsroom/feature-stories/a-day-in-the-life-of-an-inspector (last visited Sept.
22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/QL2V-5A83].
57. See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
115, 156 (2004).
58. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 413–14.
59. Id. at 414.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 434.
62. See id. at 382–83, 409–10 (finding low monitoring reliance at the FCC, FTC, EEOC, and
National Labor Relations Board).
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technology firms, such as telecommunications and cable companies.63
Even without heavy reliance on monitoring, regulators may still access
firms’ information for investigations after wrongdoing is suspected, or
in other limited contexts.64 For instance, the FTC conducts one-off
studies of a given industry or practice to decide whether it should act.65
However, unlike most large regulators, the FTC and FCC do not rely
for their enforcement actions on routinely compelling large firms to
hand over information without particular suspicion of wrongdoing.66
Thus, monitoring authority is pervasive, and monitors—despite
being overlooked in the literature and largely absent in the technology
sector—are perhaps the single most influential law enforcement group
in the regulatory state.67 An account of why regulators monitor is
overdue.

63. The CFPB also regulates fintech platforms. Rory Van Loo, Technology Regulation by Default: Platforms, Privacy, and the CFPB, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 531 (2018).
64. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 393–95.
65. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 103
(2016) (describing the FTC’s “structural case model”).
66. As one measure of this, most large regulators devote more resources to monitors than to
lawyers. See supra Table 1.
67. See supra Table 1.
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TABLE 1: SHARE OF MONITORS AND LAWYERS WITHIN REGULATORY
MONITOR AGENCIES
Monitor Employees as a Percentage of
Combined Monitor and Lawyer Workforce68
Light
Heavy
Monitors
Monitors
15-49%
50-85%
<15%
>85%
FTC 3%
FCC 34% FERC 62%
FDA 98%
EEOC 0%
EPA 60%
NCUA 97%
NLRB 0%
CFPB 54%
FSIS 95%
SEC 53%
Fed. Res. 95%
OSHA 93%
NRC 93%
FAA 93%
FMCSA 93%
OCC 93%
MSHA 91%
FDIC 86%

B. Why Do Regulators Monitor?
Courts and lawmakers weigh a number of factors in deciding
whether monitoring is appropriate. Since privacy and criminal law
scholarship has dominated the topic of administrative information
collection, existing descriptive frameworks focus on Fourth Amendment
constraints on searches.69 Those analyses unearth many of the basic
elements of a search scheme, which must be judged, according to the
Supreme Court, “by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”70
However, the analysis for courts of whether the state can
monitor does not fully answer the question of why the state monitors.
In practice, the Fourth Amendment provides minimal restrictions on
regulatory collection of business information.71 When courts invoke the
68. Table constructed from data in Van Loo, supra note 2. The acronyms not already mentioned are the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Reserve,
Food Safety & Inspection Service, Mine Safety & Health Administration, National Credit Union
Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Council, Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
69. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
70. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
71. Primus, supra note 14, at 255–56 (describing the broad judicial allowances of
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Fourth Amendment to strike down monitoring, they find a particular
implementation unconstitutional, rather than the agency’s underlying
authority.72 As a result, the regulator can still exercise monitoring
authority in a different manner, such as by more narrowly tailoring its
actions or obtaining an administrative warrant. The Fourth
Amendment also does not concern itself with regulators declining to
monitor when they could.73
A caveat is in order. Lawmakers have numerous tools at their
disposal. As an alternative to monitoring, for instance, lawmakers could
rely on heavy fines and ex post deterrence.74 These choices reflect a
fundamental regulatory tradeoff between “police patrols” and “fire
alarms.”75 Policy designers can devote resources to search routinely for
problems—as police do when patrolling the streets—or can wait for
someone to pull a fire alarm to alert the authorities.76 In the case of
regulating businesses, regulatory monitors are analogous to police
patrols, and fire alarms to employee whistleblowers. At least in some
contexts, there is evidence that an increase in regulatory monitoring is
more effective than an increase in sanctions.77 Nonetheless, a
comparison of whether monitoring deters better than its many
regulatory alternatives is beyond the scope of this Article and has yet
to be answered satisfactorily despite decades of study.78
More attainable, and still relevant to studying deterrence, is an
understanding of the basic factors that lawmakers weigh in deciding to

administrative searches under the Fourth Amendment).
72. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447–48 (2015) (striking down a requirement that hotels store guest records for 90 days); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21
(1978) (stating that a warrant could be obtained pursuant to a general administrative plan).
73. On nonmonitoring despite authority to do so, see, for example, infra Section IV.A.
74. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 209–214 (2019) (discussing factors influencing compliance with agency guidance). Moreover, even in deciding on an ex post regime, lawmakers could choose to depend on administrative agencies or private parties to bring
lawsuits, or both.
75. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165–66 (1984).
76. Id. at 166.
77. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms
in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 119 (2003) (concluding in the
context of environmental law that “increases in monitoring lead to increases in compliance and
performance, but increases in sanctions have limited effect”).
78. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 176, 179 (1968) (emphasizing the likelihood of detection and the harshness of punishment in corporate compliance); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL.
ECON. 526, 527 (1970) (developing a model on sanctions and the probability of being caught). Part
of this has to do with broader challenges in quantifying the effects of regulation. See, e.g., Richard
L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1425–26 (2014).
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extend monitoring authority.79 Three primary indicators of the need for
regulatory monitoring are a public interest in preventing harm,
information asymmetries, and a lack of faith in self-regulation. The rest
of this Part will explore these three factors and then turn to the
countervailing considerations of privacy and burden.
1. Public Interest in Prevention
Courts have begun their analysis of whether to uphold
monitoring legislation by considering the extent of the public interest.80
For instance, in various cases they have emphasized the need to
promote “public health and safety”81 or protect the environment.82 Like
the underlying legislation granting monitoring authority, these cases
regularly proceed without defining public interest or establishing how
one would know whether a public interest exists. Given the breadth of
situations in which courts have upheld monitoring authority, and the
absence of a prominent example of courts blocking monitoring for
failing the public interest requirement, the judicial standard for finding
a public interest is low.83
The public interest provides a more meaningful filter in monitoring legislation. Two components are particularly important: the mobilization of public opinion and the inadequacy of ex post compensation.
In practice, to mobilize public opinion, it has often taken a grave crisis
or media outcry. Abraham Lincoln pushed for the first of today’s large
monitoring regulators, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”), because of a crisis during the Civil War. Bank collapses from
imprudent management outraged depositors who lost their savings and
made it harder for the federal government to pay for military supplies
and soldiers’ wages.84 In response, Congress passed the National Bank
79. Identifying factors weighed contributes to the question of deterrence by, for instance,
highlighting variables to be tested empirically. Stated otherwise, to improve a framework, it helps
to understand what it is.
80. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534–35 (1967) (observing that “it is
obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official
intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen”).
81. See, e.g., id. at 535 (concluding that in this case “[t]he primary governmental interest at
stake is to prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public
health and safety”).
82. See, e.g., S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 804 F. Supp. 2d
1045, 1061 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
83. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981) (explaining the federal interest in
mine inspections partly through harms to interstate commerce); Camara, 387 U.S. at 535 (mentioning economic harms to property as justifying inspections).
84. See Eugene N. White, Lessons from the History of Bank Examination and Supervision in
the United States, 1863-2008, in FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION IN THE WAKE OF FINANCIAL
CRISES: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, 15, 18 (Alfredo Gigliobianco & Gianni Toniolo eds., 2009).
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Act of 1864, which established the OCC, authorized the on-site examination of bank affairs, and required monthly reports of their accounts
to the agency.85 At other times, muckrakers or advocates have raised
awareness. For instance, Congress passed the Meat Inspection Act of
1906 after Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle alarmed the public with graphic
descriptions of filthy food production.86
The second element of a public interest in monitoring is the belief that waiting to act until after the harm has materialized would be
insufficient because of an “irreparable harm.”87 Regulatory monitoring
becomes more appealing if courts’ ex post compensation is seen as inadequate once families have lost their homes due to risky bank behavior
or beaches have become polluted by an oil spill.
2. Information Asymmetries
The less regulators know about a firm’s activities, the more
important it is to compel information production to determine whether
intervention is needed. Courts have repeatedly cited the ease with
which businesses can conceal violations and falsify information as a
rationale for regulatory monitoring.88 However, judges look unfavorably
on monitoring when alternative sources of information are available.89
In other words, monitoring is seen as a last resort, only to be used when
alternative means of information collection, such as consumer
complaints, are insufficient.90

85. National Banking Act of 1864, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 13 Stat. 99 (1864); see also Bank
Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004).
86. Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 601–695 (2012)); Roger Roots, A Muckraker’s Aftermath: The Jungle of Meat-Packing Regulation After a Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413, 2413 (2001).
87. S. Yuba River Citizens League, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (“The court finds that inspections . . . required by the current sediment management plan are necessary to prevent irreparable
harm . . . .”).
88. See, e.g., Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 880 F.3d 274, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2018) (summarizing the line of cases discussing the necessity requirement as based on the ease of falsification of
the relevant information or ease of concealing violations).
89. See, e.g., Appeal of FTC Line of Bus. Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (assessing the validity of the FTC’s information collection by noting that “the information
sought was not available to the FTC from another federal source”); see also New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987) (finding that alternatives to warrantless inspections of business premises might not work as well).
90. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (weighing whether “any other
canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results”). The EPA, for instance, complements its
factory inspections with remote devices measuring general pollution output in a given geography.
Air Data Basic Information, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/outdoor-air-quality-data/air-data-basic-information (last visited Sept. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/A7JD-8JCZ] (noting that EPA data is collected both through “monitoring stations owned and operated mainly by state environmental agencies” and through emissions readings taken through factory inspections).
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The congressional record surrounding the creation of the OCC
shows a similar emphasis on information asymmetries. Lawmakers
believed that “very full and very stringent” examination authority was
necessary so that a bank could not “be conducted fraudulently or
dishonestly without exposure.”91 Lawmakers consequently mandated a
system based on government bureaucrats, called examiners, appearing
unannounced at banks across the nation.92
The relevant information asymmetry is not only that between
the business and the regulator, but also between the business and the
public. In passing the Meat Inspection Act, lawmakers emphasized the
public health interests in preventing sellers from causing “injury to the
uninformed” and concern about what the slaughterhouses and
meatpackers would do behind closed doors.93 Nobel Prize–winning
economics research has provided further theoretical and empirical
support for concluding that information asymmetries are pervasive
between businesses and that they create problems for regulators.94
3. Self-Regulatory Shortcomings
Sinclair’s muckraking illustrates another factor pushing
policymakers toward monitoring: the perception of inadequate selfregulation. The starting point in any industry has typically been that
“the enlightened self-interest of an entrepreneur sufficed to guarantee
the public safety.”95 In other words, once business managers are aware
of the consequences—whether reputational or otherwise—of any bad
acts, they can be trusted to take appropriate precautions. Events have
repeatedly caused lawmakers to question that assumption.
For instance, bank managers regularly acted carelessly in using
depositors’ funds prior to the Civil War, despite laws punishing banker
misconduct, and despite the risk of ruined reputations in the
community.96 More recently, food company managers knew that selling
tainted products could harm their brands and yet numerous people died
from salmonella in peanut butter, ice cream, and other packaged

91. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 824 (1863).
92. White, supra note 84, at 21.
93. 40 CONG. REC. 1133 (1906) (statement of Mr. Heyburn).
94. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); Jean Tirole, Market Failures and Public Policy, NOBEL
PRIZE 513–15 (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/tirole-lecture.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YFU-EZVT].
95. John G. Burke, Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power, 7 TECH. & CULTURE 2 (1966).
96. See White, supra note 84, at 20.
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foods.97 And oil company executives were aware that environmental
disasters could devastate their business prior to the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill, which cost BP tens of billions of dollars.98
Of course, as a practical matter, it is unrealistic to expect perfect
compliance. And it is a matter of debate whether a crisis prompts
Congress to act in ways it should have all along, or to overreact in the
wake of disaster.99 Nor is it necessarily clear the extent to which the
self-regulatory fault lies solely with the business or with the larger legal
environment. But empirical studies have found that regulatory
monitoring improves self-regulation, at least in some industries.100 One
of the theoretical reasons why monitoring may be necessary beyond
strong ex post deterrence is that people operate in a boundedly rational
manner that makes them underestimate the likelihood of a bad event
happening to them (and to the business they run), such as an oil spill
or a bank failure.101 Regardless of the empirical results, throughout
history, policymakers have regularly concluded that firms neglected to
adopt appropriate risk management practices even when the law
already imposed ex post punishment.102
C. Traditional Limits on Monitoring: Privacy and Burden
This Section provides an overview of the two basic elements
weighing against monitoring: privacy and burden. The discussion
focuses on how lawmakers and judges have traditionally examined
these considerations. As Part III will explain, these two factors are
evolving in the face of increasingly digital businesses.

97. Debra M. Strauss, An Analysis of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: Protection for
Consumers and Boon for Business, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 353, 353–54 (2011).
98. Cf. David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime,
and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1415 n.6, 1429 (2011) (discussing Deepwater Horizon in the context of prior penalties).
99. See, e.g., David Kamin, Legislating Crisis, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 34 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., 2017).
100. See, e.g., Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely
Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 361 (2010) (“We find
that organizations are more likely to follow through on their commitments to self-regulate when
they (and their competitors) are subject to heavy regulatory surveillance . . . .”).
101. See Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 268–286 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith,
eds., 2005) (discussing the challenges of deterrence with boundedly rational actors); Edward Rubin, Can the Obama Administration Renew American Regulatory Policy?, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 357,
393 (2011) (discussing the end of President Reagan’s rational actor theory of government).
102. For a review of the legislation and regulatory responses following these incidents, see, for
example, Van Loo, supra note 2.
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1. Privacy
Historically, a primary source of resistance to regulatory
monitoring was business owners’ privacy interests.103 This resistance
can be seen in early legislative discussions. In the early 1800s, for
instance, steamboat engineers consistently took their own lives and
those of thousands of passengers by operating their boats while
“ignorant, careless and usually drunk.”104 One congressman framed
proposed inspection legislation as being about “[w]hether we shall
permit a legalized, unquestioned, and peculiar class in the community
to go on committing murder at will,” but the bill still met with
considerable resistance on the basis of “the sanctity of private property
rights.”105
The interest in protecting businesses from state searches was
not as strong as that for personal matters. In Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, the Department of Labor sought to compel a
media company to produce a broad array of books and records.106 In
rejecting the company’s claim of a Fourth Amendment privacy
violation, the Supreme Court observed, “[I]t has been settled that
corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections
which private individuals have in these and related matters.”107
Additionally, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence omitted noncriminal
searches until the twentieth century.108
Despite the lower level of privacy-related protections afforded to
businesses, courts eventually added regulatory monitoring of
businesses to the sphere of activities protected by the Constitution. In
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protected a plumber from a suspicionless, warrantless
Occupational Safety and Health Administration inspection of his site of
business.109 Business owners’ privacy interests remain a factor that
weighs against routine administrative monitoring of businesses. For

103. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 63, 143–49 (Henry Steele Commager, ed., 8th ed.
1968).
104. See Burke, supra note 95, at 11.
105. Id. at 21.
106. 327 U.S. 186, 189 (1946).
107. Id. at 205.
108. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (requiring a warrant for
health and safety inspections, and overturning Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959)).
109. See 436 U.S 307, 321 (1978) (observing that the enforcement needs must be weighed
against the privacy guarantees of an inspection statute); see also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541, 543 (1967) (“The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to
go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.”).
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some courts, privacy includes maintaining sole possession of valuable
data and retaining customers who might become disgruntled if their
information were passed on to government officials.110
2. Burden
Another long-standing argument against monitoring has
perhaps increased in importance in the modern era: burden. The
business costs of designing and managing internal compliance systems,
as well as taxpayer dollars used to fund a labor-intensive oversight
force, can be substantial.111
In analyzing burden, the Supreme Court has considered
whether the information requested is “limited in scope, relevant in
purpose, and specific.”112 The state entity collecting the information is
expected to minimize the burden in providing the information.113 As a
judicial matter, the burden analysis imposes “rather minimal
limitations on administrative action.”114 A federal court did, however,
strike down a city ordinance largely due to excess burden because it
required Airbnb to hand over data, each month, about every host in New
York.115
The possibility of excess burden weighed heavily against
granting authority for early safety inspections.116 Legislatures
sometimes have attempted to specify that the scope of authorized
monitoring is exceeded if “the information or records requested are
unusually voluminous in nature.”117 Beyond concerns about preventing
a regulatory “fishing expedition,” lawmakers weigh arguments about

110. See, e.g., Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, 373 F. Supp. 3d 467, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (dividing Airbnb’s privacy interests into “competitive” in terms of keeping data from rivals, and “customer relations” in wanting to retain customers).
111. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2075, 2102–03 (2016) (“Although figures vary widely depending upon company size, average
compliance budgets are in the millions of dollars for multinational companies and for companies
in regulated industries.”).
112. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 544; see also Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408,
411, 415 (1984) (reiterating a similar standard for production of records).
113. See Appeal of FTC Line of Bus. Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (offering as one of the explanations for upholding the FTC’s line of business reporting that
“the Commission had sufficiently minimized the respondents’ burden of compliance with the reporting requirement”).
114. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 545.
115. Airbnb, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 490–92.
116. See Burke, supra note 95, at 11 (discussing concerns about costs to business owners of
inspecting steamboats).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (“A court . . . may quash or modify such order, if the information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order
otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.”).
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efficiency due to the economic benefits that lower business costs can
bring to society.118
In summary, core considerations weighing in favor of monitoring
are (1) a compelling public interest, (2) information asymmetries, and
(3) publicly salient failed self-regulation. These factors are present at
least to some extent in some of the most prominent early extensions of
monitoring authority. Pushing against those three considerations are
(4) privacy and (5) the economic costs of monitoring. A more systematic
study would be necessary to assess the relative influence and
pervasiveness of each of these five factors across all historical instances
of monitoring legislation. In theory, these five factors could also enable
the type of cost-benefit analysis used throughout the administrative
state for deciding whether to take a given course of regulatory action.119
In the absence of any such systematic analysis, as the Supreme Court
has explained, “Time and experience have forcefully taught that the
power to inspect . . . is of indispensable importance . . . .”120
II. FACTORS IN FAVOR OF MONITORING PLATFORMS
The previous Part explained how monitoring of businesses is
common among regulators and outlined the factors for and against
monitoring. This Part begins to apply those factors to platforms run by
large technology companies such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook.
Although many scholars have analogized platform risks to those in
heavily monitored industries such as pharmaceuticals,121 oil,122

118. Airbnb, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 491.
119. On the use, importance, and challenges of cost-benefit analysis, see generally Michael A.
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Retaking Rationality Two Years Later, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2011).
120. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (stating that there is “unanimous
agreement” for routine periodic inspections of all structures to achieve effective compliance).
Courts have consistently upheld agencies’ ability to collect regulatory information. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 313
(1972) (gun sales); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor sales).
121. Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 122 (2017) (“Given the close
analog between complex pharmaceuticals and sophisticated algorithms, leaving algorithms unregulated could lead to the same pattern of crisis and response.”).
122. See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance,
and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1154 (“Just as oil made machines
and factories run in the Industrial Age, Big Data makes the relevant machines run in the Algorithmic Society.”); Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the
Surveillance Economy, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 213, 215 (2017) (comparing the surveillance economy to
raw material extraction from the public domain and to European sovereigns’ financing of explorers, who by “naming and staking claim to hitherto undiscovered lands marked those lands as ownable resources and their contents as available for harvesting or capture”); Dennis D. Hirsch, The
Glass House Effect: Big Data, the New Oil, and the Power of Analogy, 66 ME. L. REV. 373, 375
(2014) (noting that tankers spill oil, despoiling coastlines and waters, in a manner analogous to
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transportation,123 and finance,124 those discussions are focused on other
dimensions of the regulatory analogy and thus pay little if any attention
to regulatory information collection.
The analysis of platforms serves several purposes. It provides a
case study to flesh out the normative framework for monitoring.
Moreover, the study of platforms provides a window into some of the
dynamics facing monitoring in an increasingly digital world. Finally,
the considerable influence of technology firms adds immediacy and
practical importance to this case study as policymakers worldwide move
toward regulatory oversight. If implemented, a monitoring program
would initially enable learning to develop new regulatory standards
and later provide a mechanism for adapting regulations to a fastchanging industry.125 In terms of enforcement, monitoring would serve
to help regulators identify platforms’ violations of broad existing laws,
such as general consumer protection and antitrust statutes,126 as well
as violations of any future platform-specific regulation.
A. Public Interest in Preventing a Harm
Scholars have identified numerous justifications for regulating
portions of the platform economy. This Section looks at four of these:
(1) privacy violations, (2) election engineering, (3) consumer harms, and
(4) speech moderation. Many of these justifications fall under
conventional rationales for monitoring—to correct a market failure or
protect other core values.127 Each is examined for whether it
demonstrates a public interest in need of prevention—meaning that ex
post court remedies, or waiting for the harm and punishing the
wrongdoer afterwards, would prove inadequate.
how large companies like Target, Uber, and Equifax have allowed hackers access to hundreds of
millions of credit cards, passwords, and social security numbers).
123. See Ganesh Sitaraman, Regulating Tech Platforms: A Blueprint for Reform, GREAT
DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE 3, 5 (2018), https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Regulating-Tech-Platforms-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA2T-LQVQ] (analogizing
tech platforms’ antitrust challenges to railroads, public accommodations, and utilities).
124. See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-to-Fail 2.0? Digital Service Providers as CyberSocial Systems, 93 IND. L.J. 1211 (2018) (comparing digital service providers to major financial
institutions); K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the
Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2018) (analogizing platforms to
finance and telecommunications).
125. On how monitoring informs policymaking, see Van Loo supra note 2.
126. See infra note 337 and accompanying text.
127. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 4 (2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5EL-69C5] (“Correcting market failures is a reason for regulation . . . . Other possible justifications include improving the functioning of government, removing distributional unfairness, or promoting privacy and personal freedom.”).
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1. Privacy Harms to Individuals
Platforms can harm consumers, purposefully or accidentally, by
allowing their data to reach third parties. Platforms purposefully sell
personal data, or the advertising insights gained from analyzing such
data, to third parties.128 Facial recognition technologies can identify
customers when they enter an establishment, and algorithms can
search a customer’s past transactions to determine whether a sales
representative should approach.129 Wearable devices, such as FitBit,
collect health and behavior data for use by insurance companies setting
monthly premiums, lenders establishing credit rates, and even
employers deciding whether to hire.130 While this data may benefit
consumers by tailoring products, data sharing can also enable
companies to charge consumers more by identifying consumers that are
naïve or complacent.131
Firms’ privacy practices also implicate nonmonetary values.
Facebook recently came under criticism for allowing a data broker,
Cambridge Analytica, to obtain millions of users’ account information.
Cambridge Analytica then used that data to promote election
candidates. From a legal perspective, this conduct was problematic
because Facebook’s privacy disclosures did not make it clear that data
would be used for such purposes.132
Privacy harms also occur when a firm fails to safeguard data. By
infiltrating the systems of Uber, Yahoo, and other platforms, hackers
have acquired hundreds of millions of people’s names, social security
numbers, birth dates, addresses, credit card information, and other
personal information.133
Once data is stolen, it can be resold on the dark web, living on
indefinitely in the hands of thieves.134 Regardless of future government

128. See, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 12, at 1676.
129. See Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 355, 355 (2015) (“We live in a world where every action we take can be observed,
recorded, analyzed, and stored.”).
130. See Alexandra Troiano, Wearables and Personal Health Data Putting a Premium on Your
Privacy, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1715, 1715 (2017).
131. See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing transactional harms).
132. Congress and the FTC have given firms broad legal leeway to use consumer data as they
like—so long as they are candid about it. Morgan Hochheiser, The Truth Behind Data Collection
and Analysis, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 32, 35–37 (2015). The efficacy of this
approach is considered in the discussion of self-regulation. See infra Section II.C.
133. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Attack Exposes Data of 143 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2017, at A1.
134. See Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the
Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1090 (2017) (“Modern criminals use the dark web to carry out
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intervention, hacking victims may need to take additional precautions.
Impersonators have opened various accounts, left bills unpaid, and even
committed crimes that later appear on innocent parties’ records.135
Some of these issues have taken the victims years, and many court
battles, to resolve.136 The stress of a criminal accusation cannot be
undone—to the extent that “the process is the punishment,”137 the
ultimate arrest of the perpetrator would prove insufficient. Further, the
victim is left in fear of it all happening again because the data could
remain available to criminals.
Thus, platforms implicate an important public interest in
privacy. And ex post remedies appear inadequate. Platforms’ privacy
implications therefore demonstrate the basic elements of a public
interest in prevention.
2. Influencing Civic Behavior: Election Engineering
Several years after Jonathan Zittrain warned that Facebook
could alter the outcome of “a hypothetical hotly contested future
election,”138 the Russian government attempted just that. From 2015 to
2016, computer scientists sponsored by the Russian government
created social media accounts posing as Black Lives Matter supporters
or the Tennessee Republican Party, gaining hundreds of thousands of
followers.139 They deployed bots, or autonomous programs that interact
with computer systems, to create and spread messages.140 By one count,
these bots reached 126 million voters in an effort to spur support for
Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump.141
Concerns about online platforms influencing elections find
additional support in experimental research. One study examined
whether the Facebook news feeds influenced voting behavior in the

technology-driven crimes, such as computer hacking, identity theft, credit card fraud, and intellectual property theft.”).
135. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, A 17-Year Nightmare of Identity Theft Finally Results in
Criminal Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at A10.
136. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Internalizing Identity Theft, 13 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009);
Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
1227, 1244 (2003).
137. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT (1979).
138. Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 335, 336 (2014).
139. Apuzzo & LaFraniere, supra note 8.
140. Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Broad Reach of Campaign by Russians Is Disclosed,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2017, at B1.
141. Id.
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2010 congressional elections.142 The researchers inserted graphics with
voting booth locations and friends’ “I Voted” buttons in some users’
feeds, while withholding such graphics from others.143 The results
suggest that about 340,000 people voted nationwide as a result of the
interventions. Those results seem modest compared to the study’s sixty
million participants, but recall that ten years earlier, the 2000
presidential election was decided by 537 votes.144 It is further possible
that alternative intervention designs could produce a greater impact,
particularly if messages are targeted at certain political groups.145 The
study thus demonstrates the potential for an election to be “quietly
engineered” using platforms.146
There is no clearly sufficient remedy when election tampering
becomes observable after the fact. A repeat election would surely prove
contentious and would risk undermining stability and public faith in
elections.147 Additionally, it might take months or years to reveal the
manipulation, as it did with Russian tampering.148 Influences on civic
behavior thus likely satisfy the requirement of a public interest worth
preventing.
3. Transactional Harms
Platforms drive diverse economic activities. Search engines such
as Expedia help people decide what to buy and for how much. Bitcoin
exchanges and financial apps like Venmo enable transactions to occur
through new payment systems. Consumers are beginning to outsource
shopping and finance to digital butlers, or robo-advisers, which find the
best deals and purchase products when the consumer simply clicks
“approve.”149 Although they bring great benefits, these emerging

142. Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political
Mobilization, 489 NATURE 295, 295 (2012).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Zittrain, supra note 138, at 336–39.
146. See id. at 339 (referring back to the hypothetical election).
147. See Jeffrey A. Karp et al., Dial ‘F’ for Fraud: Explaining Citizens’ Suspicions About Elections, 53 ELECTORAL STUD. 11, 17 (2018) (explaining that doubts regarding the “integrity and security” of the election process and management can “erode citizen’s trust” in political actors, the
government and democracy).
148. See Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia
Story So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/Y3AT-845A] (providing a
timeline which illustrates that the federal investigation into Russian tampering did not begin until
months after Trump won the 2016 presidential election).
149. See generally Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 309 (2017).
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intermediaries can skew information in ways that cause costly
mistakes.
Consumer harms can, in the extreme, lead to physical injuries.
For example, investigative journalists uncovered in 2017 that
TripAdvisor had removed posts that talked about crimes committed in
hotels.150 Many guests had, for instance, posted about being assaulted
and robbed at a vacation resort in Riviera Maya, Mexico, but had their
posts deleted.151 Subsequent travelers chose to go to the same resort
after reading TripAdvisor’s redacted reviews, only to become victims of
those same crimes.152 Because unfavorable reviews would deter hotels
from advertising on the site, TripAdvisor may have had incentives to
delete reviews alleging assault.153 Regardless of the motives, when
business practices jeopardize personal safety, legal design principles
generally prefer ongoing monitoring.154
Other platform-facilitated transactions result in discrimination
and monetary harms. Repeated studies found that Airbnb hosts are
more likely to cancel reservations from guests thought to be racial
minorities.155 Investigations faulted Amazon and Facebook for
deceiving consumers, including many children, into paying hundreds or
thousands of dollars through in-app purchases, which allow a video
game player to purchase additional abilities or time with a quick
click.156 Facebook employees referred to such practices as “friendly
fraud,” and called children racking up thousands of dollars in fees
“whales,” a term used by casinos to refer to heavy gamblers.157

150. Raquel Rutledge & Andrew Mollica, Misery in Mexico: Tourists Say TripAdvisor Blocked
Warnings, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 1, 2017, at A1.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. This can be seen in safety-related agencies that overwhelmingly rely on monitoring, such
as the FAA, FDA, and OHSA. See generally Van Loo, supra note 2.
155. See Press Release, Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous., Department Of Fair Employment And
Housing Reaches Agreement With Former Airbnb Host Who Cancelled Reservation Texting “One
word says it all. Asian.” (July 13, 2017), https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2017/07/2017-07-13-Suh-Airbnb-Press-Release.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Y38-PT9F]
[hereinafter Airbnb Agreement]; infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. Platforms may also
facilitate other forms of discrimination, such as that based on age. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Age Discrimination by Platforms, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1 (2019).
156. See F.T.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 WL10654030, at *11 (W.D.
Wash. July 22, 2016) (holding Amazon accountable for third-party app developers’ charges through
its app store and on Kindle products); I.B. ex rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 989, 996
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (class action regarding in-app purchases made by minors on Facebook).
157. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Unseal Judicial Documents at Ex. K, Bohannon v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-cv-01894-BLF (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 24, 2019), ECF 193-6 (“Friendly Fraud – what it is, why it’s challenging, and why you
shouldn’t try to block it.”); Facebook’s Opposition to The Center for Investigative Reporting Inc.’s

2019]

MONITORING IN THE SURVEILLANCE AGE

1591

At a more subtle level, search results generated for a product on
Amazon, eBay, or other sites can subtly cause consumers to pay more
simply by making it harder to find the best deal or offering confusing
product specifications, through a tweak to the search algorithm.158
Those practices have come to light in part because academics have
occasionally obtained unusual access to internal company data.159 From
a theoretical perspective, a growing number of antitrust scholars have
argued that the monopoly power of online platforms may be used to
bankrupt competitors and ultimately lead to higher consumer prices
and less innovation.160
Assuming the harm will eventually become known and
quantified, consumer protection laws have often viewed ex post
remedies as sufficient for monetary harms.161 Unlike with death or
physical injury, the breaching party can, in theory, pay money
afterwards or perform specific acts to put the other party in the position
she would have been in had the harm never occurred. In ex post
transactional regimes, regulators tend to rely more on direct-toconsumer disclosures, in which the business is required to provide
clarifying information to consumers, such as the price per unit on
grocery shelves.162 Similarly, the law handles many antitrust violations,
such as price fixing, through ex post remedies.163 The regulator, mostly
the FTC at the federal level, does not routinely collect nonpublic
information in these transactional contexts.164
But lawmakers have concluded that ongoing monitoring is best
for some types of transactional harms. In consumer protection, banking
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Unseal Judicial Documents at Ex. OO, Bohannon v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-cv-01894-BLF (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2018), ECF 179-3 (“Would you refund this whale
ticket?”).
158. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the
Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 428–29 (2009); Michael Dinerstein et al., Consumer Price Search
and Platform Design in Internet Commerce 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
20415, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20415.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS33-77T4].
159. See Ellison & Ellison, supra note 158, at 433 (relying on a company’s decision to share
nonpublic cost and sales data); Dinerstein et al., supra note 158, at 2 (same).
160. See ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND
PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 11–13 (2016); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly Lobel,
Platform Market Power, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1051, 1051 (2017); Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 716–17 (2017); John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets,
72 VAND. L. REV. 1497 (2019); John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 (2015); John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
513, 515 (2018).
161. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Consumer Protection Without Law, 33 REGULATION 26, 27 (2010).
162. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 653–55 (2011) (discussing examples of such disclosure regimes).
163. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 160, at 722–25.
164. See supra Section I.A (providing an overview of monitoring across regulators); infra Section IV.A (discussing the FTC’s regulatory approach).
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regulators such as the CFPB routinely visit and collect reports from
banks in search of unfair and deceptive acts or discriminatory
lending.165 In antitrust, companies must submit sizeable mergers to
authorities for approval, rather than completing the merger and letting
authorities or competitors sue afterwards.166 And the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”), a private company, must obtain regulatory
approval before changing the rules for trading stocks—in part because
of its monopolistic nature, which may increase harms such as
undetected self-dealing and compromised access to the market.167
Some platforms arguably present comparable shortcomings with
respect to ex post remedies. Amazon has gatekeeper and network
structures, along with difficult-to-observe consumer harms, that raise
regulatory challenges similar to stock exchanges.168 A pure ex post
approach poses notable challenges, illustrated by the European
Commission’s twelve-year process to fine Google $2 billion—the largest
monetary penalty in antitrust history—for crushing once-promising
startups.169 Given that digital industries provide first-mover
advantages and network effects,170 a startup has a small window of
opportunity to compete that may have closed by the time regulators or
courts have obtained the information needed to intervene ex post.
Overall, the heterogeneity of harms makes it difficult to classify
platforms’ transactional conduct broadly as being better regulated by
monitoring or ex post litigation. From an institutional perspective,
however, at least some large online platform harms—such as removing
safety-related information, causing significant financial harms, and
stifling startup businesses—reflect those that have driven
policymakers to identify a public interest in preventing the harm using
monitoring.
4. Speech Harms
Online platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube direct the flow of communications among users and must
decide what information to allow on their platforms. Some editing of
content implicates state accountability. For example, in 2016, an

165. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
167. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 665 (1975).
168. See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1319–20 (2017) (analogizing oversight of online platforms to oversight of the NYSE). On the network effects of platforms, see, for example, EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 160, at 231.
169. Commission Fines Google, supra note 10.
170. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 160, at 231.
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onlooker recorded a police officer shooting Alton Sterling, who was
being held to the ground by other officers. In another incident, the
girlfriend of Philando Castile filmed the aftermath of his fatal shooting
during a traffic stop.171 These videos’ widespread circulation prompted
nationwide protests, Department of Justice investigations, and police
department reforms, including more widespread body camera
requirements.172 But the movement came close to being technologically
blocked. Shortly after the Castile video was posted, Facebook
moderators removed it for being too graphic. They reposted it twenty
minutes later with a viewer discretion warning,173 but had the platform
gone with its initial decision to take the content down, it could have
amounted to a significant speech harm.
Platforms also curate content directed at individuals or groups.
Since their early years, Facebook and Twitter have sought to remove
harmful content including racist comments and other hateful speech.174
Yet scholars have argued that these measures have not gone far enough
to address revenge porn, cyber harassment, and “troll armies” designed
to intimidate critics into silence.175
Internet intermediaries have great discretion as moderators
because the Communications Decency Act protects them from liability
for users’ content.176 For instance, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the
plaintiff sought damages because AOL failed to remove defamatory
posts from its message boards.177 The court held AOL immune from
such suits under the Act, paving the way for broad website operator
discretion as to whether and how to curate content.178
Moreover, platforms’ filtering role has recently intensified. For
many years, Twitter moderators allowed white supremacists to use the
site but would remove any post deemed offensive.179 In December of

171. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1600 (2018).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1600–01.
174. Id. at 1625–26.
175. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62, 66–67 (2009);
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 345, 349 (2014); Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547, 548
(2018).
176. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
177. 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
178. Id. at 330–32. But see Spy Phone Labs LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 15-cv-03756-KAW, 2016
WL 6025469, at *1, *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016) (denying in part a motion to dismiss based on
the Communications Decency Act because of allegations of bad faith).
179. Twitter also withheld official “verification.” Thomas Kadri, Speech vs. Speakers, SLATE
(Jan. 18, 2018, 12:56 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/01/twitters-new-rules-blur-the-linebetween-extremists-speakers-and-their-speech.html [https://perma.cc/2HWP-BNZF].
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2017, however, the company began to suspend many accounts based on
the account holder’s offline persona, a move dubbed “#TwitterPurge.”180
In early 2018, Facebook announced that it would play an editorial role
in deciding which news was sufficiently high quality to reach users,
rather than solely letting the number of clicks decide.181
Although online platforms are private domains, the moderation
of online content has free speech implications. When private actors
perform a public function, such as by operating corporate towns, some
courts have deemed them functionally equivalent to public actors.182
But courts are reluctant to find public functions, and in analogous
contexts, such as shopping malls and public television channels, the
Supreme Court has made clear that a private entity does not
necessarily perform a public function merely because it holds a forum
open to the public.183
A recent Court ruling underscores the free speech tension in
content moderation. In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court struck
down a state statute barring sex offenders from participating in social
networks.184 The Court observed that to prevent “access to social media
altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate
exercise of First Amendment rights.”185 Because the state—not the
platform itself—blocked access in this case, it is unclear what
remaining ability the state has to regulate platforms’ own restrictions
on access and content.186
In the pre-digital era, the harm of having one’s speech blocked
or being subject to harassment could not necessarily be undone.
Nonetheless, the law has predominantly relied on ex post judicial
remedies, such as fines and injunctions, to regulate harassment.187
180. Id.
181. See Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook to Rank News Sources, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2018, at
B1 (“The most ‘broadly trusted’ publications—those trusted and recognized by a large cross-section
of Facebook users—would get a boost in the news feed, while those that users rate low on trust
would be penalized.”).
182. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502–503, 510 (1945) (holding that a Jehovah’s Witness had First Amendment rights while distributing literature on the sidewalk of a privately
owned town).
183. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 519 (1976); Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 318–19 (1968), abrogated by Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518–19.
184. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737–38 (2017).
185. Id. at 1737.
186. Cf. Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship
Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1062 (2018) (“[T]ech companies should adopt special policies
and procedures to protect against governmental overreach.”).
187. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296,
2340 (2014). Entry restrictions, such as demonstration licenses, have also been used. See id. at
2299.
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Fully evaluating the wisdom of that emphasis is beyond the scope of
this Article, but it is possible that the reliance on ex post measures is
partly explained by the impracticability of monitoring all potential
harassment in real time. Offline harassment can occur during a
completely private interaction, whereas harassment that happens on
platforms introduces a third party—the information technology.
Therefore, monitoring could be more plausible in the digital context.
Facebook, for example, has developed tools to identify harassment,
including tracking IP addresses to recognize when blocked users open
a new account in order to message the same person who blocked
them.188
Overall, the strength of the public interest factor varies by the
four categories of harm discussed above. Harms such as privacy and
election meddling are in need of heightened prevention. Some
transactional harms and speech harms have stronger countervailing
considerations, such as the possibility of ex post monetary
compensation and a preference for not stamping out speech in advance.
But many transactional harms merit prevention, and even some speech
harms might justify monitoring of the platform’s practices. A holistic
view of platforms suggests that they meet the basic threshold of
implicating public harms worthy of prevention.
B. Information Asymmetries
The second major reason regulators might monitor an
industry—information asymmetries—is potentially heightened for
online platforms given their limited observability as compared to other
monitored industries. Absent a monitoring regime, the government is
dependent on how observable a harm is by either those harmed or some
third party, such as journalists. However, the more consumers cannot
see what is happening to others, and the more complex the underlying
decisionmaking process, the more difficult it is for individuals to
monitor a company’s behavior. One reason why the CFPB regularly
examines bank records for personal financial harms, even small fees, is
that consumers will not necessarily know they are harmed and would
have difficulty knowing whether someone else with the same credit
score got a different deal.189

188. Antigone Davis, New Tools to Prevent Harassment, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec. 19,
2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/new-tools-to-prevent-harassment [https://perma.cc/
3QJT-VYLS].
189. See Van Loo, supra note 12, at 1372–73.
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Platforms demonstrate incredible complexity through their
individualized black-box interfaces.190 Yet the visibility of platform
harms varies by category. Consumers cannot easily observe security
precautions and privacy because, by its nature, a company does not
share such information publicly.191 For many instances of identity theft,
victims may learn of the harm once they receive a bill for unauthorized
purchases or observe an unexplained depletion in their bank account.
But consumers will not necessarily know when their data has been
hacked. It took years before the public learned of millions of
compromised accounts at Yahoo and Uber.192 Indeed, companies have
taken steps to hide such security incidents. Uber paid a ransom to keep
the breach quiet.193
Nor is the selling or use of personal data easily observable.
Consumers may never know that they were routed to a less helpful call
center, charged more for a loan, or had their data sold to a third-party
data broker such as Cambridge Analytica. Companies are not required
to disclose to customers that others paid lower prices.194
While elections, transactional consumer harms, and some
categories of speech harms may have observable elements, these harms
are predominantly opaque. They are marginally more observable than
privacy harms in that voters can report questionable election messages
in social media feeds, posters can see the number of retweets or video
views to infer silencing, and small businesses can run Google searches
to learn if they have been delisted.195 Sometimes platforms even notify
users that their post has been removed, or could be required to do so by
substantive law.196 Explicit discrimination can be observed by the
victim, as when an Airbnb host cancelled a California mountain cabin
rental minutes before the guest arrived by texting, “One word says it
all. Asian.”197

190. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission – Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1178 (2008) (discussing the black-box
nature of search engines); Van Loo, supra note 168, at 1270–72 (describing the nonsalience of
digital harms).
191. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Assessing the Federal Trade Commission’s Privacy Assessments,
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Mar.-Apr. 2016, at 58, 58.
192. Knutson & McMillan, supra note 9.
193. See, e.g., Isaac et al., supra note 9.
194. See PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 163–64 (analyzing the opacity of companies’ decisions).
195. For instance, some of Google’s small-business competitors suddenly saw their revenues
drop precipitously, prompting them to lodge complaints with antitrust regulators. See Commission
Fines Google, supra note 10.
196. See, e.g., Rutledge & Mollica, supra note 150 (noting that TripAdvisor issues messages
after deleting posts, citing “various reasons for the deletions”).
197. Airbnb Agreement, supra note 155.
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The challenge with many means of observation is that
“companies fastidiously study consumers and, increasingly, personalize
every aspect of the consumer experience.”198 If an Airbnb host denies an
individual’s request for lodging, it is unclear whether other consumers
of different races received preferential treatment. However, insight is
possible with the right information and access. One field experiment
used fake accounts and over six thousand messages to determine that
on average, hosts were sixteen percent less likely to accept reservations
from distinctly African-American names, even when every other aspect
of the guest’s profile was identical.199 Airbnb swiftly blocked the
academics’ accounts, and platforms have even more sophisticated
techniques to identify fake accounts.200 Other researchers seeking to
understand related problems, such as why Google shows lower-paying
job ads to women than to men, have faced similar barriers of access to
the relevant nonpublic information.201 As a result, relying on the
cooperation of platforms to share necessary information will not
necessarily suffice to identify and understand harms.
Any two social media feeds may differ greatly based on the users’
digital profiles, including makeup of followers and past clicks.202 The
products or election advertisements users see may also vary. Any given
person has limited knowledge of other user experiences, since most only
have access to their single feed. Consequently, Instagram moderators
may deprioritize or bury a post in users’ feeds without the poster
knowing. Facebook voluntarily announced its platform’s ability to
influence elections, although it could have withheld that private
information.203 Essentially, platforms can effectively silence tweets,
tailor election news, or aid sellers in selectively charging higher
advertised prices, all while obscuring that conduct from affected
individuals.
It would be a complex undertaking for the harmed party to
identify and track the many subtle ways that any two feeds differ in

198. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 995 (2014).
199. Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from
a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J., Apr. 2017, at 1, 1–2.
200. See id. at 4.
201. See Amit Datta, Anupam Datta, Jael Makagon, Deirdre K. Mulligan & Michael Carl
Tschantz, Discrimination in Online Advertising: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 81 PROC. MACHINE
LEARNING RES. 1, 14 (2018).
202. Roger McNamee, How to Fix Facebook—Before It Fixes Us, WASH. MONTHLY
(Jan./Feb./Mar. 2018), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january-february-march-2018/
how-to-fix-facebook-before-it-fixes-us/ [https://perma.cc/CS87-QP4P].
203. Kevin Roose, What Has Facebook Learned Since the 2016 Election?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2017, at B3 (interviewing Facebook’s Chief Security Officer, who stated that Facebook undertook
research into behavioral influence of its own volition).
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terms of the ordering, timing, and composition of items displayed.
Analyzing millions of feeds would require a sophisticated analysis with
unprecedented access to many individuals’ personal accounts.204
Individuals and small businesses, in particular, would likely be unable
to monitor effectively.
Even if users observed that their business was deprioritized or
that an advertisement was tailored, they would not necessarily know
why. Platforms use complex, continually changing algorithms to
produce web search results and social feed content.205 Users would
likely be unable to determine whether they were losing out in the search
results based on the competitive merits or due to the gatekeeper’s desire
to lessen competition.
These information asymmetries reflect those in other monitored
industries. Like social media feeds, consumer financial products are
tailored to the individual.206 A borrower generally cannot attribute
higher mortgage rates to illegal factors, such as race, or may be unable
to understand the fine print terms that impose hidden fees.
Additionally, by some accounts, companies such as Google and
Apple have taken corporate secretiveness to new levels in an effort to
prevent competitors from copying innovations.207 They use
nondisclosure and nondisparagement agreements liberally, and
develop tools for hiding information.208 One Uber software program
identified transportation regulators; when they opened the app, Uber
would create a “ghost screen” displaying fake drivers. After the
regulator requested a ride, the cars would disappear from the screen,
giving the impression that cars were no longer available.209 Platforms
can thus deploy legal and technological tools not only to limit public
information access, but also to tailor user experiences such that one
external observer’s inferences would be irrelevant to another’s. Given
the intensely secretive culture and inscrutability of digital technologies,

204. Of course, data for some accounts is publicly available, but Facebook would be able to
control which accounts are subject to manipulation and whether that data is available publicly.
205. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 190, at 1168.
206. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 835 (2019).
207. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 67
(2015) (describing Google’s secretiveness); Tom C. W. Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 911, 914 (2012) (describing Apple’s secretiveness).
208. See, e.g., SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 56–57 (2019).
209. Mike Isaac, Uber Uses Tech to Deceive Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2017,
at A1.
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there may be no other industry with greater public-private information
asymmetries than online platforms.210
C. Self-Regulation
Historically, monitoring legislation has followed prominent legal
violations by businesses—presumably based on the conclusion that the
prior reliance on self-regulation was faulty or at least politically
unacceptable.211 By that basic measure, the platform economy, like
more heavily regulated industries, has failed the test of selfregulation.212 Indeed, an industry built in part by skirting the law and
evading regulators, with a prominent motto of “move fast and break
things,”213 is an unlikely candidate for self-regulation. But before
jumping to the alternative of a full regulatory monitoring regime, it is
necessary to consider not only the effectiveness of monitoring, but also
the different versions of industry self-regulation as embraced in the
literature or utilized by the FTC: public disclosure and private thirdparty monitoring.
1. Private Monitoring and Transparency
Observers have proposed private monitoring regimes or making
information publicly available, thereby letting markets or private
actors hold businesses accountable.214 One version of this is mandated
disclosures to the end user. Also, by faulting Facebook for being unclear
with users about what would happen to their data, the FTC pushes the
platform to disclose risks and harms.215 Well-designed disclosures can
help, but they have traditionally performed poorly because hardly
anyone reads the fine print of contracts.216 Even if people did, they likely
210. Cf. Cohen, supra note 7, at 190 (“The platform-based environment . . . is characterized by
both information abundance and endemic information asymmetry.”).
211. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 384–95.
212. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
213. Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
383, 446 (2017).
214. See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and
Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1597 n.10 (2014) (summarizing the political appeal of mandated
disclosures); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 631 (1979) (arguing that in
deciding whether market regulations are warranted, the most important criterion is whether “imperfect information has produced noncompetitive prices and terms”).
215. See Decision and Order, Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 0923184, No. C-4365 (F.T.C. July
27, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JW9-HPY6].
216. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the
Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2014).
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would not understand the contents, and even simpler prominent
disclosures often fail to realize their intended purpose.217
Disclosures might also target public or third-party experts,
which would require platforms to make some part of their underlying
code publicly available.218 Private parties would then periodically
observe platforms in a kind of crowd-sourced monitoring. Disclosurebased regulation is one of the most widely supported interventions, both
among policymakers and legal scholars, because it preserves freedom of
choice.219 However, without other legal reforms and careful design, such
disclosures have limits because voluntary third-party experts—
including reputation websites—may lack resources or motivation.220
Additionally, under any public disclosure regime, competitors would
acquire any information released, meaning that such information would
need to be more limited.221 As a result, after a company has
transgressed, its settlement agreement with a public entity often
requires the hiring of a private third-party monitor to assess
compliance.222
The FTC applied both mandated disclosures and private
monitoring when it learned that Google and Facebook had violated
privacy policies in 2011 and 2012. Facebook had allowed its users to
keep their information private, but repeatedly made that information
public.223 The consent orders required the companies to pay for thirdparty “assessments” of their compliance, with heightened privacy
policies outlined in the settlement.224
Facebook’s assessor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, upon reviewing
Facebook’s online policy and direct assertions, submitted annual
reports to the FTC verifying that Facebook was in full compliance and
217. Id.; Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 162, at 665.
218. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 150–51 (discussing transparency in context of firms
that use personal data); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 393, 419–22 (2014) (arguing that transparency of private companies is increasingly important in the big data age).
219. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 214, at 1597 n.10.
220. Sofia Ranchordás, Online Reputation and the Regulation of Information Asymmetries in
the Platform Economy, 5 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 127, 129–34 (2018)
221. See PASQUALE, supra note 33, at 163–64 (discussing balance between trade secrets and
monitoring of internet search engines).
222. Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?,
34 J. CORP. L. 679, 680 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1714 (2007); Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 524 (2014). Companies also voluntarily undertake
monitoring in response to public regulation. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2038 (2005).
223. See Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 092-3184, 2011 WL 6092532, at *3 (F.T.C. Nov. 29,
2011) (Agreement Containing Consent Order).
224. Id. at *5.
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taking the necessary precautions to safeguard user data.225
Subsequently, evidence emerged that Facebook failed to protect privacy
in accordance with its published policies, most prominently when one
of its apps helped transfer millions of users’ data to Cambridge
Analytica for psychological profiling during the 2016 presidential
election.226 It is worth noting that Google and Facebook were able to
comply with their third-party assessments by simply making assertions
to the third party about their privacy policies, a process that falls short
of a full audit.227 Thus, the performance of these regimes does not reflect
how a more empowered third-party auditor would have performed.
Perhaps a truly independent private third party could provide
that benefit.228 Regulators other than the FTC have deployed more
powerful private auditors with “unrestricted access” to the regulated
entity’s documents.229 In theory, these private monitors could provide
many of the benefits of public monitors, and indeed scholars have often
proposed private rather than public monitoring of platforms.230 Private
monitors have the advantage of using fewer public resources and
avoiding governmental acquisition of private information.
Another common reason for preferring a disclosure-oriented or
private third-party regime is that either regime would use monitors
with more sophistication and resources than bureaucrats.231 After all,
government agencies pay considerably less than Silicon Valley firms.232
225. See Nicholas Confessore, Audit Approved of Facebook Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2018,
at A18 (discussing the compliance audits and noting that Facebook determined which policies that
PricewaterhouseCoopers (now known as PwC) reviewed). See generally Hoofnagle, supra note 191,
at 58 (distinguishing FTC assessments from audits).
226. See, e.g., Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 75–76 (2018).
227. See Megan Gray, Understanding and Improving Privacy Audits under FTC Orders (May
5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3165143 [https://perma.cc/KDZ54ZPW].
228. See G.S. Hans, Note, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and FTC Enforcement: Broadening Unfairness Regulation for A New Era, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 163, 191 (2012)
(“Much will depend on the vigor and effectiveness of the privacy audits and the FTC’s response.”).
229. Root, supra note 222, at 584; see Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 222, at 1732.
230. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to
Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4–5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3351404&download=yes
[https://perma.cc/354YM6DE].
231. Cf. Vladeck, supra note 25, at 514 (2016) (concluding that regulatory auditing of algorithms “would pose an enormous challenge to regulators, who . . . may not have the expertise required to design and carry out a sufficiently robust audit”).
232. P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV. & BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, CYBER IN-SECURITY II: CLOSING THE
FEDERAL TALENT GAP 25 (2015), https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
Cyber_In-Security_II__Closing_the_Federal_Talent_Gap-2015.04.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/CU4658BM] (calculating that senior-level software engineers could make $33,000 more in the private
sector than in the federal government and entry-level engineers could make more than $14,000
more).
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Moreover, bureaucrats often have protected employment status, which
has led critics to argue that regulators cannot easily update their
workforce with training or more technologically savvy employees.233
Many believe that a third-party regulatory regime would make it less
likely that “the government will remain several steps behind.”234 In
light of these advantages and the political obstacles to government
regulation, wholly private monitoring could offer a sensible policy
option.
Nonetheless, private monitors also have several shortcomings.
A company hired to monitor has incentives to please the customer
paying the bills—which is typically the regulated entity.235 A secretive
industry is also unmotivated to share its inner workings with another
business or the public.236 Considering these factors and the empirically
supported successes of government monitoring in other industries, it is
likely that regulatory monitoring of platforms—or at least publicly
accountable private monitors—would offer the best option as long as
the government reflects democratic values.
2. Regulatory Monitoring Design and Effectiveness
One challenge for the typical analysis is that an incident of failed
self-regulation does not mean that a direct monitoring regime would
have done better. Companies still engage in substantial wrongdoing in
heavily monitored industries. Despite having OCC and CFPB
examiners on-site year-round, Wells Fargo employees opened millions
of unauthorized accounts in customers’ names for years until the
publication of a Los Angeles Times exposé.237 Any platform-monitoring
regime, even helped by the most sophisticated of private-sector
analysts, would have limits.238 Despite these uncertainties, empirical
studies of government inspections across different jurisdictions and

233. Frank Ostroff, Change Management in Government, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2006, at 141
(critiquing federal agencies for having inflexible workplaces that inhibit innovation and prioritize
the avoidance of failure over promotion of exceptional performance).
234. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 160, at 231.
235. The agency usually has at least veto power over the choice. See Khanna & Dickinson,
supra note 222, at 1723. On the related inadequate incentives of stock exchanges to monitor, as
well as liability strategies to address such inadequacies, see Yesha Yadav, Oversight Failures in
Securities Markets, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2754786 [https://perma.cc/FDX4-LPJY].
236. See supra Section II.B (discussing platforms’ secretive cultures).
237. James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo Not the Only Bank to Have Created Unauthorized Accounts—But Regulator Won’t Identify Others, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-unauthorized-accounts-occ-20180608-story.html [https://perma.cc/MGE6-KUMH].
238. Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2017) (discussing limitations of auditing algorithms).

2019]

MONITORING IN THE SURVEILLANCE AGE

1603

timeframes suggest that governmental monitoring increases
compliance.239
Critics’ points about a sophistication imbalance between
government and private monitors have merit, but as a basis for
resistance to government monitoring, the argument reflects a
misconception about the operation of monitoring regimes. From a
functional perspective, regulatory monitors utilize three main
categories of information collection: direct observations, explanations,
and self-regulatory processes. Direct observations would mean
examining the activities, such as looking at how the factory machines
operate, or perhaps monitoring various outputs, such as chemical
discharge into air and ocean waters.240 The next level would require the
business to explain how those specific operations function, perhaps
mandating an analysis performed by the business. Instead, many
monitors focus on the third category: self-regulatory processes. For
example, government inspectors ensure that offshore oil platforms
install and use mandatory safety devices that prevent explosion by
shutting down drilling if the machinery temperature rises too high.241
They also look at whether training programs and internal procedures
position employees to mitigate and respond to emergencies.242
To apply a similar regime to digital platforms, a regulator would
ask the platform to identify which internal organizational processes
filter out foreign political ads, protect against hackers, or prevent
racially discriminatory behavior. The monitor would ideally be
technologically savvy, but even one without a strong technology
background would be capable of analyzing organizational processes to
determine whether firms were asking the right questions and
measuring the right outputs. Some outputs would also be discernible to
monitors since most platforms have live feeds or other means of
communicating to management what is happening.243
Dialogue would further allow government monitors to better
comprehend complex algorithms. Regulatory monitors do not simply
examine in silence, but as part of a dialectic process. Bank employees
sometimes need to break down a complex new financial instrument so
that the Federal Reserve examiner understands whether it violates the
law or poses a new risk.244 Environmental inspectors “rely on industry
239. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 98, 1426–27.
241. See Hayes, supra note 56.
242. 40 C.F.R. § 112.21 (2018).
243. See generally Klonick, supra note 171 (discussing internal moderators’ roles).
244. See PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 165
(2015) (describing the complexity facing bank supervision).
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representatives to explain the technology at a facility.”245 Similarly,
regulatory monitors could question platform coders or ask to see the
internal reports that those coders produced. In the context of privacy,
for instance, regulators could ask platforms to provide privacy impact
assessments. They might also routinely ask the regulator to provide any
updates to privacy practices within the prior six months, such as any
new types of data collected or any new third parties that are receiving
user data.
To be clear, even after adopting these approaches, monitors of
platforms may still have more blind spots than do monitors in other
industries. But perfect regulatory understanding is not the standard.
Instead, regulatory comprehension is better seen as existing along a
spectrum. Without ex ante monitoring authority, regulators currently
operate with minimal algorithmic knowledge. If monitoring increased
that comprehension from five to fifty percent, regulators would lack
total comprehension, but that increase would be a meaningful
advancement. If a disclosure regime would move public oversight from
five to ten percent comprehension, but with less burden and more
political support, that is an alternative to be weighed—or an additional
measure that could create a pluralistic public-private monitoring
regime.246
It is impossible to know precisely how far any particular regime
would move a regulator along the comprehension spectrum. Nor does
space allow for determining which items from the menu of monitoring
options would work best for platforms—auditing raw complaints or
assessing compliance systems, conducting on-site examinations,
requiring remote report submissions, or other tactics. Indeed, the
answer will vary by the type of harm and platform. But regulatory
monitoring would certainly add a significant degree of knowledge to the
current state of substantial real-time ignorance in the face of fastshifting platforms.
III. FACTORS WEIGHING AGAINST MONITORING PLATFORMS
The previous Part showed how the three criteria in favor of
monitoring are met at a basic level, at least regarding some harms and
platforms. That brings the analysis to two main considerations
245. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 28–30, 77 (2011),
https://www.sintef.no/globalassets/project/hfc/documents/gpo-oilcommission.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8QQ7-Z7SQ].
246. See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the
Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. REV. 27, 30 (2019) (connecting public and private ordering options).
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historically weighing against monitoring: privacy and burden. Each
factor is complicated with respect to online platforms given their role in
surveillance and their core product being information itself.
A. Business Owners’ Privacy
Historically, privacy weighed against monitoring due to the
importance of the business owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy.247
However, business owners’ privacy expectations have not restricted
monitoring in other industries, including the routine collection of
sensitive profit data for antitrust scrutiny.248 Is there any reason to
think that business owners’ privacy interests carry extra weight for
platforms? It helps to approach that question by looking at “the privacy
interests of the people involved” rather than the privacy interests of the
entity.249
Perhaps the best argument is the enhanced role of intellectual
property, a key legal tool deployed in platforms’ secretive cultures.250 A
regulator that leaked valuable trade secrets would, in a sense, violate
the business owners’ privacy interests.251 Although trade secrets and
sensitive competitive information are exempt from the Freedom of
Information Act,252 businesses have exploited the Act to access FTC
information, demonstrating commercial motivation to exploit
monitoring data.253 Heightened secrecy can, however, be seen in other
industries, such as finance, where investment strategies and business
acquisitions are closely guarded.254 Any platform-monitoring regime
would need to mitigate the spread of trade secrets by limiting
information collected only to that necessary and limiting the sharing of
any information once it is collected.255
It is otherwise difficult to see how the type of information
collected for regulatory oversight would meaningfully threaten
business owners’ privacy. That information would be related to the
technologies deployed and the company’s interactions with users,

247. Supra Section I.C.1.
248. See supra Section I.A.
249. See Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 33 (2014).
250. See sources cited supra note 207 and accompanying text.
251. See Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, 373 F. Supp. 3d 467, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
252. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2012).
253. Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1405 (2016) (finding that thirty-four
percent of FTC requests were from commercial entities).
254. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 207, at 911.
255. See, e.g., David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 208–10 (2010)
(detailing the highly confidential nature of bank examinations).
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rather than about the business owners’ personal lives.256 Early
constitutional privacy protections of business records resulted from
Fifth Amendment concerns about sole proprietors, and the Court
declined to extend those protections to corporations.257 The Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leaves open the question of whether
the collective entity should have privacy protections, but arguably
“most corporations in most circumstances should not have a
constitutional right to privacy.”258 Thus, to the extent the business
owners are themselves users of the company’s technologies, the
business owners’ personal privacy dovetails with the privacy of the
platforms’ users.
B. Users’ Privacy
Privacy offers another increasingly important argument against
monitoring: in collecting information from businesses, regulators may
collect sensitive consumer data. As a starting point for the normative
analysis, customers’ privacy has not prevented regulatory monitoring
of sensitive personal information in other industries. The SEC, CFPB,
and FDA, not to mention the Census Bureau and Internal Revenue
Service, collect a broad range of sensitive financial, medical, and
household data.259 However, platforms have a far greater quantity of
personal data than businesses did when Congress extended monitoring
authority in other industries. Commentators and the public now have a
heightened concern about surveillance. Should these concerns change
the analysis for platforms, or perhaps for regulatory monitoring more
generally?
Surveillance is a general term that focuses on the collection of
personal information.260 It implicates regulatory monitoring in part
because government agencies have often used platforms to surveil
individuals—leading one commentator to depict the modern era as one
of “liquid surveillance.”261 Technology firms have given the state

256. For more on the type of information collected, see infra Section IV.C.
257. See Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 841–44 (2005)
(reviewing Fifth Amendment privacy origins).
258. Pollman, supra note 249, at 32.
259. Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 219–21 (2015) (surveying
sensitive information collected by numerous government entities under force of law).
260. See, e.g., LYON, supra note 18, at 14; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1937 (2013).
261. See Balkin, supra note 187, at 2297 (2014) (“The technologies and associated institutions
and practices that people rely on to communicate with each other are the same technologies and
associated institutions and practices that governments employ for speech regulation and surveil-
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visibility into people’s associates and interests from social media
behavior, spending habits from credit card statements, and a growing
array of other details from smart-home device data.262 Surveillance
could thus pose a problem for regulatory monitoring because the very
transfer of information from technology companies to the government
is associated with an overbearing bureaucracy violating an important
right.263
To weigh the real privacy risks of regulatory monitoring, it is
instructive to draw two distinctions between regulatory monitoring and
state surveillance. One distinction relates to the type of entity that is
collecting the information. The other concerns the nature of the
information collected.
1. Organizational Distinction: Crime Agencies Versus Regulators
From an entity perspective, business regulators should be
analyzed separately from crime agencies. Conflating these two types of
entities is problematic because they have different institutional
cultures regarding information collection. Crime agencies have
regularly exceeded the bounds of public comfort with information
collection. To provide a few examples: in 1968, the Supreme Court held
in a prominent case, Katz v. United States, that federal agents had
violated the Fourth Amendment by wiretapping a public pay phone
without obtaining a warrant, and the case garnered significant
attention;264 later, President Richard Nixon used federal law
enforcement agencies to spy on political rivals and activist groups;265
and more recently, former Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) analyst
Edward Snowden leaked classified documents revealing that the NSA
had conducted a warrantless search of electronic communication

lance.”); Richards, supra note 260, at 1940 (“It might seem curious to think of information gathering by private entities as ‘surveillance’ . . . [b]ut in a postmodern age of ‘liquid surveillance,’ the
two phenomena are deeply intertwined.”).
262. Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 MINN. L.
REV. 577, 588 (2017); Kim & Telman, supra note 25, at 725–26; Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers
and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1090–91 (2002). Palantir alone has helped the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), FBI, NSA, and ICE detect drug
distribution rings, profile people for airport searches, and identify criminal suspects. Sarah
Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977, 985, 993–95 (2017).
263. See infra Section IV.C.
264. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
265. Wylie Stecklow, The Curious and Questionable History of FISA: From Richard Nixon and
George W. Bush to Edward Snowden, FED. LAW. Jul. 2016, at 59, http://www.fedbar.org/ImageLibrary/Sections-and-Divisions/Civil-Rights/The-Curious-and-Questionable-History-of-FISA.aspx
[https://perma.cc/EBP4-WKXS].
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databases that included metadata from almost every U.S. citizen.266
Public anger at these and other programs has led to a “patchwork of
limits from disparate sources” now regulating access to various
personal data sources, such as social media postings and “digital
records of an individual’s movements.”267
Whereas Congress has regularly constrained crime agency
surveillance, it has repeatedly done the opposite with regulators,
concluding that regulators underutilized the authority they already
had.268 For instance, the FDA already had the ability to inspect food
manufacturers when, in 2010, an estimated 1,939 people became
seriously ill from salmonella in peanut butter, ice cream, spinach, and
other products.269 Congress responded to the outcry with legislation
stating that the FDA “shall increase the frequency of inspection of all
facilities,” and requiring at least one inspection every three years for
high-risk manufacturers.270 Similarly, federal authorities gained the
power to inspect underground mines in 1941, but an explosion ten years
later in Illinois that killed 119 miners prompted Congress to mandate

266. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 14, at 107. That bulk collection had resulted from agencies’
aggressive application of section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, which did not on its face appear to
authorize such collection of Americans’ telephone records. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–62 (2012)). The
legislation ended the NSA’s bulk collection of Americans’ phone call metadata. See 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861(b)–(c) (2012).
267. Berman, supra note 262, at 581–82; see, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)–(c) (limiting bulk collection of data); Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 285 (2016) (referring to public anger). Katz
prompted Congress later that year to pass the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211–25 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522 (2012)). See Nicholas J. Whilt, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Protecting the Civil
Liberties That Make Defense of Our Nation Worthwhile, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 361, 371 (2006) (mentioning the influence of Katz on legislation). Congress responded to President Nixon, and related
concerns, with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”) as the “exclusive means
by which electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(f) (2012); see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); Stecklow,
supra note 265, at 59 (describing FISA as a “Nixon Legacy,” “born in the aftermath of unlawful
behavior of the executive branch of government”).
268. One notable exception to this is the Paperwork Reduction Act, but that applies to agencies
beyond business regulators, including those engaged in national security, and restricts information collected from individuals as well as businesses. Some categories of business monitoring,
such as inspections, are exempt, as are some categories of crime agency information collection,
such as those in the midst of an investigation. 44 U.S.C. § 3518(c)(1)(A), (C) (2012) (exempting the
collection of information for federal criminal investigations, prosecutions of particular criminal
matters, and certain FTC civil processes).
269. Strauss, supra note 97.
270. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 201, 124 Stat. 3885, 3923–24
(2011) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 350j(a) (2012)).
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an annual inspection of each underground coal mine.271 Congress has
imposed similar minimum annual monitoring of oil and gas
platforms,272 underground mines,273 large banks,274 credit rating
agencies,275 and nuclear plants.276 Notably, crime agency statutes do not
contain such minimum surveillance stipulations.277 In short, as public
choice theory suggests, regulators tend to undercollect information.278
As a result, policymakers considering regulatory monitoring should
have less organizational concern about overzealous government
officials violating individuals’ privacy—including for any program
involving regulatory monitoring of platforms.
What about the possibility that business regulators would hand
over personal information to crime agencies? The distinction between
crime agencies and business regulators would matter less if business
regulators shared all of the personal information collected with crime
agencies. Regulators do sometimes share information with other law
enforcement agencies for prosecuting criminal matters related to their
mission. For instance, the FTC’s mission of protecting consumers
implicates criminal fraud. When the agency identifies businesses
engaging in fraud, it hands the matter over to the agency with the
ability to prosecute criminal matters in court.279 Statutes often dictate
these links between regulators and crime agencies.
Beyond such mandated interagency sharing, the information
transfer is limited by several factors. Most importantly, various
statutes curtail how agencies can disclose information. The Privacy Act
provides general limitations on an agency’s ability to disclose
individuals’ records to other governmental agencies, except under
enumerated exceptions.280 The Act also limits access within the agency,
271. Alexa E. Welzien, MSHA’s Pattern of Violations Authority: Reviving an Untapped Resource of Enforcement Power, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (2011).
272. 43 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (2012).
273. Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat.
1290 (requiring four annual inspections for all underground mines).
274. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(1) (2012) (“The appropriate Federal banking agency shall, not less
than once during each 12-month period, conduct a full-scope, on-site examination of each insured
depository institution.”).
275. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 932(a)(8), 124 Stat. 1376–2223 (2011) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p) (2012)).
276. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 10(6)(c), 60 Stat. 755 (mandating varying inspection frequencies for nuclear plants).
277. For instance, the Stored Communications Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act do not impose minimums. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–03 (2012); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–11 (2012).
278. On public choice theory predicting that regulators would more plausibly have an antiregulation tendency, see Bagley & Revesz, supra note 32, at 1262.
279. See Criminal Liaison Unit, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/criminal-liaison-unit (last visited Sept. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/N8RH-KBFN].
280. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2012).
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allowing access only to those “who have a need for the record in the
performance of their duties.”281 Many industry-specific statutes go
further, such as requiring disclosure to the individual whose medical
records were requested or prohibiting any use of those records “for any
purpose other than the litigation or proceeding for which such
information was requested.”282 Some of these statutes make it a
criminal offense for government officials to disclose information
collected.
Two institutional factors further mitigate the concerns about
handing over information. First, when regulators collect sensitive
information, the monitoring group would be expected to establish
firewalls. From an institutional perspective, agency divisions tend to be
selective about what they share even when others in the same agency,
such as enforcement attorneys, desire unfettered access.283 Even when
they are supposed to work together and coordinate to prevent disasters,
agencies have resisted coordinating functions.284 Since regulators’
employees would risk themselves breaking the law by inappropriately
sharing personal information, the sharing of personal information
should be seen as having significant motivational barriers. These and
other sources of “internal administrative law”285 help to deter regulators
from routinely passing information to crime agencies.
Finally, crime agencies do not need regulators’ help to obtain
access to extensive personal data. Through the maligned third-party
doctrine, the Court has held that when people voluntarily share
information with a third party, they usually have no reasonable

281. Id. § 552a(b)(1).
282. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(v)(A) (2018) (covering medical records under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(J) (2012) (limiting access to
education records).
283. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1148 (2012) (analyzing the balkanized nature of federal agencies and noting
that “information sharing and coordination remain significant challenges to the effective operation
of the fragmented regime”); Van Loo, supra note 2, at 397–98 (discussing how monitors guard
nonpublic information closely, partly to encourage business cooperation).
284. See FIN. STABILITY BD. & INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND
INFORMATION
GAPS
18–20
(2009),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102909.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TK2Y-6PPP] (explaining how insufficient information sharing contributed to the
financial crisis of 2008); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters:
Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1455 (2014) (describing the ongoing “turf war” between the FBI and the CIA). Nonetheless, agencies pervasively coordinate functions, and sometimes share information informally. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note
283, at 1156.
285. Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV.
1239 (2017).

2019]

MONITORING IN THE SURVEILLANCE AGE

1611

expectation of privacy in such information.286 Consequently, the
Constitution provides minimal limits on crime agencies’ access to user
data from platforms even without a warrant.287 The FBI, CIA, and other
agencies have hired leading private-sector data brokers, such as
Palantir, to amass and analyze large amounts of private data.288
Therefore, regulatory monitoring implicates users’ privacy less than
does crime surveillance due to agency cultural differences, crime
agencies’ independent information access, and existing privacy laws
that restrict regulators’ ability to hand over information.
2. Information Distinction: Personal Versus Organizational
Those concerned about potential monitoring harms to users’
privacy must also consider the type of information sought. One
categorization is vital for monitoring in the digital era—whether the
information collected is personal or organizational.289 That distinction
is important because popular alarm about surveillance stems from the
collection of personal—not business—data.
There is no doubt that for some platform harms, data from user
accounts would be vital. To determine whether an algorithm was
discriminating improperly, for instance, the monitor would need some
mechanism for at least inferring characteristics about users, such as
race.290 Again, it bears emphasis that federal agencies face considerable
political and legal pressures to safeguard personal data. Although the
286. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). The Court recently weakened
the doctrine in a case that excluded cell phone location data. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (“In light of the deeply revealing nature of [cell-site location information], its
depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving
of Fourth Amendment protection.”). On the widespread criticism and debates surrounding the
third-party doctrine, see, for example, Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party
Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1239 (2009).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing voluntary
sharing of information with Yahoo as grounds for allowing government use of such data); Slobogin,
supra note 257, at 809 (discussing widespread government access to personal records using subpoenas).
288. See discussion supra note 262 and accompanying text.
289. Christopher Slobogin has emphasized the importance of this distinction between personal
and business records in the context of government investigation of crimes. Slobogin, supra note
257, at 808–09.
290. On data being used for discrimination, and legal responses, see, for example, Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 719 (2016); Christopher K. Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, 92 S. CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3349478&download=yes [https://perma.cc/
4MLG-VRD2]; Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3347959&download=yes [https://perma.cc/Z2UB-ZMLJ]; Rory Van Loo, The
Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547, 579–80 (2016).
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Fourth Amendment overall provides minimal restrictions on regulatory
information collection, it would be more likely to restrain regulators
collecting personal information than business information.291 Various
statutes have restricted government agencies above that floor. The
Privacy Act, for example, imposes criminal penalties on government
employees for improper use of personal data.292 The Stored
Communications Act restricts government access to emails.293 And the
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 requires
annual independent information security evaluations of agencies,
performed by the Inspector General.294
Accordingly, regulators take precautions in handling personal
data, such as firewalls and encryption. Furthermore, for some harms
requiring access to user accounts, it may be possible to provide the data
to the regulator in de-identified form, such as by replacing the name
with a randomly generated number. Government agencies, like private
businesses, have at times failed in their efforts to protect privacy, and
anonymization has limits.295 But it is worth recognizing that deidentification can reduce the risks of regulatory analysis of some
personal data when it is collected.296
Of course, government entities, like businesses, are vulnerable
to hacks and leaks.297 However, the legal constraints on agencies
arguably go further than laws constraining private businesses, as the

291. As the Supreme Court explained in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, the
“basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials.” 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Exactly what makes a search personal is undefined and “established by general social norms.” Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981).
292. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
293. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012).
294. Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, § 2(a), 128
Stat. 3082 (2014) (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3555(a)–(b)) (specifying that for agencies with an
Inspector General, the Inspector General will lead the annual evaluation). Federal agencies must
also conduct privacy impact assessments for information systems that use personally identifiable
information. E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012).
295. See, e.g., Hans, supra note 15, at 2 (“Too much individual data is being collected, stored,
and sometimes disclosed without anyone asking or answering some very important questions.”). If
implemented poorly, anonymized data can reveal too much. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1719 (2010); Ira
S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV. 703 (2016).
296. The challenges can largely be determined in advance for a given data set, and for difficultto-anonymize categories of data, there are solutions that still allow for robust monitoring. Ohm
provides five factors to weigh in deciding whether data can be anonymized. See Ohm, supra note
295, at 1765–68.
297. On government data breaches, and related concerns about agency data collection, see, for
example, Kimberly A. Houser & Debra Sanders, The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: Efficient
Solutions or the End of Privacy as We Know It?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 866 (2017); Adam
B. Thimmesch, Tax Privacy?, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 375, 389 (2018).
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Privacy Act only applies to government entities. Thus, while
precautions must be taken and the risks involved in collecting personal
data obviously must be considered, in weighing those risks it is
important to recognize that regulators already have a legal structure in
place for handling personal information.
Additionally, unlike crime agencies—which need users’
identities to assess their personal targets—regulators are looking for
wrongdoing by the business.298 Above all, regulators need business
information, not personal information. They can analyze companies’
internal policies and procedures, or even examine the code behind
various algorithms, without obtaining any user data. In theory, they
could ask the business to conduct a particular quantitative analysis
about, say, the number of fee complaints that Facebook received using
the word “child,” without the regulator ever receiving any information
about a particular user. In practice, regulators go to great lengths to
minimize the collection of personally identifiable information, given
their lesser need for it and the controversies surrounding it.299
Finally, it is worth noting that the normative analysis of privacy
in the monitoring framework may be flipped for platforms. In most
historical extensions of monitoring, whether in banking, the
environment, or health, agencies received extensive monitoring
authority despite privacy concerns weighing only against monitoring.300
In contrast, today one of the main goals of any regulatory monitoring
regime for platforms would presumably be to ensure those companies
are respecting users’ privacy.301 Thus, even if the regulator collected
personal information for that purpose, the privacy risks created by the
regulator would need to be weighed against the privacy benefits of the
additional regulatory oversight. However, since regulators could audit
a platform’s privacy systems without collecting personal data, the

298. Regulators are enforcing mostly civil laws against businesses, meaning that tracing users
to conduct is largely irrelevant. This is particularly true for transactional and privacy-related
harms. See supra Section II.A. Speech harms, as mentioned above, provide a weaker case for monitoring than other categories, but even those harms could be monitored without collecting identifiable data, as the goal would be to categorize blocked speech, which could be determined by examining the platforms’ internal rules alone. If the regulator wanted particular examples, it could
ask for the user conduct or words that led to ostracizing a given user, without obtaining the user’s
identity. See supra Section II.A.4. Speech harms and election engineering would, however, come
closer to implicating criminal wrongs, and thus any program would need to weigh the value of
identifying wrongdoers and the threats to privacy in the collection of such information. If the communications were already publicly available on a social media platform, there would be fewer privacy concerns.
299. Infra Section IV.C (summarizing political pressures on regulators regarding personal information).
300. See supra Section I.C.1.
301. See supra Section II.A.1.
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privacy analysis should overall weigh more in favor of regulatory
monitoring in the surveillance age than it did in prior eras.
To be clear, agency officials could potentially misuse regulatory
information acquired about businesses and individuals—or an
unscrupulous executive could seek to leverage it to persecute political
opponents. Those issues are, however, more about design of the
regulatory monitoring—and indeed about appropriate constraints on
government power—than about whether to extend the authority in the
first place.302 Legal and organizational safeguards are crucial for any
regulatory monitoring program. The main point here is that avoiding
regulatory monitoring of platforms altogether due to anxiety about
individual privacy would be inconsistent with a broader perspective on
regulatory monitoring, privacy, and the administrative state.
C. Regulatory Burden
How should the costs of compliance be weighed in the case of
platforms? There is little that can be said with certainty about the
monetary costs of monitoring platforms because no such program exists.
Three potential sources of burden lie in stifling innovation, increasing
the costs that the platform incurs in providing information to the
regulator, and spending public resources collecting and processing the
information.
One possibility is that monitoring could chill innovation by
making the innovator nervous about trying something new, out of fear
of being punished for the unknown. Or monitoring could deter new
entrants because of the costs of complying with heavy oversight,
thereby deterring the entrance of new ideas.303 While it may be true
that “[w]e couldn’t kill the Internet if we tried,”304 the issue is largely
theoretical because the interplay between regulation and innovation is
poorly understood as an empirical matter.305 Also, the potential for
stifling innovation is a broader point about regulating business in
general, as a similar concern could be raised about other enforcement
302. Although I return to the question of designing monitoring programs in Section IV.C, infra, that topic is sufficiently capacious to require a separate project.
303. See, e.g., David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 765–70 (2001).
304. Paul Ohm, We Couldn’t Kill the Internet If We Tried, 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 79, 85
(2016). Another possibility is a chilling effect in which users do not want to provide their data to
firms out of fear that the government will attain it. See Niva Elkin-Koren & Michal Gal, The
Chilling Effect of Governance-By-Data on Data Markets, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 407 (2019).
305. Keith N. Hylton, A Unified Framework for Competition Policy and Innovation Policy, 22
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 163, 164 (2014) (discussing how competition policy often omits innovation
considerations).
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mechanisms, such as ex post litigation. Society has so far rejected
suppression of innovation as an argument against regulation, given the
prevalence of regulation in the economy, but the narrative may hold
greater weight for platforms, given the industry’s entrepreneurial
ethos.306
A more tangible cost is the expenditure of resources to transfer
information.307 Those costs could be substantial and should be factored
in to any proposed oversight regime. In undertaking such a prospective
analysis, it would be valuable to leverage the empirical studies of the
costs of monitoring in other industries. The challenge with doing that,
however, is that overall compliance costs are driven by the extent of the
substantive regulation in addition to the costs of monitoring. Since far
fewer substantive laws govern platforms than, say, banks, platforms
would presumably have less information to transfer—and thus a lower
monitoring burden.308
For the estimates to be comprehensive, they should include the
potential savings that studies have found from governmental
monitoring. These savings include benefits to shareholders, who may
not be able to sufficiently monitor the risks taken by a firm’s managers,
as well as the avoidance of compliance costs that the firm would have
otherwise undertaken.309 Counterintuitively, since platforms already
spend a considerable amount of money on data security, it is possible
that a centralized regulator providing monitoring services across an
entire industry could reduce some platform costs by providing
economies of scale—or add shareholder value by providing more
reliable monitoring of risks.310
Platforms might even interface with monitors more efficiently
than have businesses in other industries. Monitoring is, after all, about
transferring information. One of platforms’ core specialties is collecting
and transferring information in a highly automated manner. Thus,
platforms’ monitoring burden may be significantly less than for
companies whose core operations are far from information technology.

306. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 409 (1989) (discussing the expanding role of regulation since the new deal).
307. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 799–800 (2003).
308. The amount of information that would need to be transferred per law is also relevant to
this equation.
309. See, e.g., Emilio Bisetti, The Value of Regulators as Monitors: Evidence from Banking
(June 12, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3081537 [https://perma.cc/67Z9-WQ3J] (finding that reduction of Federal Reserve monitoring of banks increased firms’ internal compliance costs and lowered shareholder value).
310. The gains to shareholders would need to be weighed against any value destroyed by monitoring.
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D. Summary of Factors for Monitoring Online Platforms
Among the four types of public interest discussed—privacy, civic
engagement, transactional integrity, and speech—the strength of the
case for monitoring varies. The case for monitoring speech harms, for
instance, is weaker than for monitoring election engineering.311
Nonetheless, the main normative historical drivers of monitoring are
largely present in online platforms: harms worth preventing,
insufficient public information, and a track record of failed selfregulation.
The factors that might weigh against monitoring platforms are,
if anything, potentially weaker than in other monitored industries.
Platforms can transfer information to regulators at a lower cost, since
data is their core product. While the issue of privacy has certainly
become more complex in the digital era due to users’ privacy interests,
at the very least, concerns about users’ privacy should not prevent
regulators from collecting only business information, rather than
personal information. For most types of harm, an informative
monitoring program is possible without a regulator ever collecting
personal data and instead focusing on information about the platform
and its processes.
However, where personal data collection is necessary to protect
users, there are precedents in other industries for legally and
organizationally constraining agencies that collect highly sensitive
information. Ultimately, citing personal data as a reason against
regulatory monitoring of platforms would be a red herring. Rather,
privacy arguably strengthens the case for monitoring platforms since
large business owners’ privacy interests are minimally affected.
Moreover, those minimal interests must be balanced against the
privacy interests of millions of platform users in having regulatory
oversight of how platforms use their data.
Legitimate privacy concerns, as well as the need to protect trade
secrets and minimize regulatory burden, underscore how any
monitoring
regime
should
be
designed—with
appropriate
accountability and burden-minimizing processes in place. Those details
would need to be worked out in a way that is sensitive to the specific
platform and harm. The main point here is that if policymakers were to
weigh the principal factors as they have in oil, pharmaceuticals, food

311. Nonetheless, compared to the alternative of leaving it entirely to platforms, there is still
a normative and historical case for monitoring content moderation. See supra Kyle Langvardt,
Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1353 (2018); Section II.A.4.
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safety, and most other major industries, they would find normative
foundations for monitoring platforms.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY MONITORING
The case study of platforms most immediately suggests that
policymakers should consider building new monitoring programs for
the increasingly digital economy. It also shows how the information
collection framework developed in a pre-digital era is in need of
refinement. Most importantly, in the surveillance age, policymakers
must balance a more complex set of privacy interests.
A. FTC Monitoring of Platforms
What steps would be necessary for regulatory monitoring of
platforms? No single agency would have jurisdiction over all of the
categories of public interest discussed above, but the FTC has authority
to enforce two of them: privacy and transactional harms.312 Yet the
agency currently operates on a largely ex post model that has failed in
the past to assess whether online platforms are taking necessary steps
to safeguard user data.313 Their antitrust enforcement processes also
allow platforms to establish themselves during critical periods of
competition, after which it would likely be impractical to undo the
harm.314 While legislation and other agencies may be necessary for
monitoring other types of platform harm such as election engineering
and speech moderation, this Section examines the FTC’s relatively
straightforward path to monitoring the surveillance economy.
Because the FTC has generally not engaged in monitoring
except in narrow contexts where explicitly required by statute, its legal
authority to develop a monitoring regime of platforms is in many
regards unsettled. But under section 6(a) of its originating statute, the
agency has the power “[t]o gather and compile information concerning,
and to investigate from time to time the organization, business,
312. See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6805 (2012). On the FTC’s privacy enforcement, see, for example, Chris
Jay Hoofnagle, FTC Regulation of Cybersecurity and Surveillance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 708, 708, 722–23 (David Gray & Stephen Henderson eds., 2017) (observing
also that “regulation of the private-sector has effects on the government as surveillant”); Daniel J.
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
583, 585 (2014).
313. See supra notes 223–225 and accompanying text.
314. Cf. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The Federal Trade Commission’s Inner Privacy Struggle, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 179 (Evan Selinger et al.) (2018) (“The delay involved in FTC processes gives respondents time to establish their platform and shut out competitors.”).
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conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership, or
corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce.”315 It also
has the authority to require regular submission of reports, which it used
in 1975 to request cost and sales data from 450 of the largest U.S.
manufacturing firms.316 Cost and sales data is particularly sensitive
and closely guarded information, which explains why about 180 of the
companies filed motions to quash.317 In upholding the program, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that the FTC’s statute
“provides a clear basis of authority for the Commission to issue orders
requiring corporations to submit informational reports to the FTC.”318
Subsequent legislative reforms to the FTC’s authority have preserved
its main monitoring tools.319
In 1980, Congress passed the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”),
which requires Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) approval for
certain information collection activities.320 But OMB approval is only
required for information collection from ten or more entities, meaning
that the FTC could at least collect information from the most important
nine platforms or through one-off requests.321 Moreover, as an
independent agency, the FTC has the statutory option of overruling any
OMB rejection.322 For these and other reasons, the Act is more of a legal
barrier to the type of industry-wide information collection used in
rulemaking—but has not generally prevented regulatory monitoring.323
Indeed, the FTC even recently used 6(b) authority to collect sensitive
315. FTC Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 6(a), 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 46(a)
(2012)).
316. Appeal of FTC Line of Bus. Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curium).
317. Id. at 692.
318. Id. at 693. This observation arose even though no parties questioned the FTC’s authority.
Id. The court also noted that the FTC’s order was “clearly investigatory in nature.” Id. at 696.
319. The FTC Improvements Act of 1980 directed the agency to use civil investigative demands
(“CID”s) instead of subpoenas for investigating unfair and deceptive acts, though not for competition. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 (2012)). The CID is broader in scope, but the tools are functionally
the same and separate from the regular report collection function. See A Brief Overview of the
Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Apr. 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/
WK5A-87J6].
320. Pub L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012)).
321. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c)(4) (2018).
322. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3502(5), 3507(f) (2012). Of course, that move by the FTC may be politically
untenable. The full extent of independence from review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) is debated and evolving. See Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 506–07 (2014).
323. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012) (listing independent agencies covered by the Act, such as
banking regulators, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission); Van Loo, supra note 2, at 408–12 (describing monitoring by same
agencies).
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information from large companies for a one-off study, after satisfying
the PRA requirements.324
Consider, also, how FTC monitoring might be viewed in the
context of the surveillance state. The Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) has surveilled individuals extensively despite
an originating statute granting only the ability to “investigate”
suspects.325 The FBI has conducted far-reaching personal surveillance
with an enabling statute that mentions only the authority to “detect”
crimes.326 The FTC’s explicit authorizations to “gather and compile” and
“investigate from time to time” more clearly indicate monitoring
authority than do the originating statutes of the DEA and FBI. Viewed
against the backdrop of expansive DEA and FBI surveillance under
vaguer originating authorities, the FTC’s ability to build a monitoring
program is even stronger—particularly since it would be collecting
information from businesses, rather than individuals.327
Supreme Court decisions provide further support for FTC
monitoring authority. The Court has concluded that the FTC’s organic
statute provides “ample power” to require reports, as well as to send
investigators to examine a company’s books.328 More broadly,
regulatory requests for business records do not require a warrant, or
even allegations of a particular violation, as long as the requests are not
unreasonable and relate to “general or statistical investigations.”329
Thus, the FTC’s enabling statute and direct case history, along with
courts’ treatment of other regulators and crime agencies, indicate that
the commissioners can construct a vigorous platform-monitoring
program if they so choose.
Monitoring requires personnel, so the FTC would need to either
obtain new allocations or reassign existing employees. Limited

324. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY 37–38 (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftcstudy/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F7S38LZT] (compelling companies, after meeting PRA requirements and using 6(b) authority, to provide nonpublic information to study patent competition).
325. See Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974) (codified at
5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2012)).
326. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 531, 533 (2012). The FBI has not sought to justify its surveillance under
this detection clause and has instead looked to the unconvincing residual authority of the All Writs
Act—which is also available to the FTC. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012)); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 126 (2018) (noting frequent use by FBI).
327. See supra Section III.B.2.
328. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 649 (1950).
329. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1946); see also McLane Co. v.
EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159 (2017) (noting that the EEOC should be given access to any material that
might be relevant to the investigation).
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resources undermine detection.330 Nonetheless, the agency’s current
workforce could support a meaningful level of monitoring. The CFPB
runs a substantial monitoring apparatus with over 400 examiners,
compared to about 350 attorneys.331 The FTC has an insignificant
number of monitors and over 700 attorneys.332 Platforms would require
fewer monitors than financial institutions, because the latter are some
of the most heavily regulated businesses, requiring the CFPB to
monitor over one hundred large banks, thousands of payday lenders,
and many other categories of financial institutions for compliance with
dense laws.333 Devoting even one hundred FTC employees to monitoring
would allow meaningful examinations, especially if focused on the ten
largest platforms.334 At the very least, the FTC’s leaders should actively
decide whether it is worth diverting resources from their other activities
to monitoring platforms, rather than assume no other option exists. The
FTC’s recent move to create a twenty-person task force to “monitor”
platforms for antitrust violations demonstrates the plausibility of such
resource reallocations.335 However, for the FTC to develop a monitoring
program more in line with that of most other large regulators, the
agency would need to devote more resources; expand its monitoring to
cover other areas of its mission, such as privacy and consumer
protection more broadly; and make it a routine practice to compel
businesses to produce information rather than doing so only in a more
ex post manner once a particular issue has clearly become a problem.
What the FTC would do with such information is not the subject
of this Article. Still, despite more limited civil penalty and rulemaking
authority than some other agencies,336 the FTC has wide-ranging
consumer protection and antitrust authority designed to evolve with
markets.337 It would be able to take significant action to address some
of the privacy and transactional harms discussed above.
330. See, e.g., Hoofnagle, supra note 314, at 170.
331. Van Loo, supra note 2, at App. A.
332. Id.
333. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65
UCLA L. REV. 232, 237, 271–75 (2018) (summarizing the CFPB’s authority).
334. Moving employees to monitoring would require a cost-benefit analysis of the relative importance of those employees’ other tasks. Given the prominence of platforms in the modern economy, the harms presented by platforms should compare well.
335. See sources cited supra note 37 and accompanying text.
336. During a deregulatory period of the 1980s, Congress curtailed the agency’s ability to impose civil penalties and write rules, making the FTC in this regard weaker than, say, the CFPB.
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 (2012)).
337. Its mandate to regulate unfair and deceptive acts is purposefully broad, designed to
change on an “evolutionary basis” alongside markets. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957,
982 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Additionally, the prospect of a federal regulator bringing public lawsuits,
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However, a monitoring program need not involve aggressive
prosecutions. Ex post legal investigations typically result in a formal
enforcement action after major wrongdoing has occurred. In contrast,
monitoring fits well with the modern emphasis on collaborative
governance—that is, working with firms to solve problems rather than
adopting a punitive approach at the first signs of wrongdoing.338 By
identifying issues early on before they have become systemic, the FTC
would be better situated to steer firms away from problematic practices
before major liabilities materialize.
Nor does a monitoring regime need to involve extensive
information collection. As explained above, the FTC could still learn a
great deal without analyzing source code or collecting large troves of
detailed information. The FTC could, for example, examine whether
companies have appropriate privacy practices by requesting existing
internal summary reports and explanations from employees.339 After
the FTC initially learned more about how a given platform operated,
and as substantive platform regulations developed, it would have a
better sense of what types of questions to ask to identify ways that the
platform could avoid causing harm.
In some instances, existing internal reports and insights would
not exist, in which case the FTC or Congress would need to take
additional steps, such as imposing “audit trails” on platforms to ensure
they record the reasoning and facts related to their decisions.340 Other
tools, such as ordering companies to conduct technical systems tests,
may be needed.341 Private third-party monitors could also complement
FTC monitoring—although the FTC has less ability to impose private
monitoring industry wide than it does to exercise its own authority to
collect information.342 Finally, it would be valuable to determine what
types of information are necessary to achieve particular goals and the
even if those actions would have limited monetary impact, would hold some sway in motivating a
large platform to comply with requests.
338. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 397–98.
339. See supra Section II.C.
340. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1305
(2008) (discussing audit trails for government entities’ automated decisions); Crawford & Schultz,
supra note 12, at 121–24 (applying Citron’s proposal to the private sector).
341. See Hoofnagle, supra note 191, at 7.
342. The FTC currently deploys third-party private monitoring through settlement agreements and for limited periods of time, which is different from the kind of ongoing monitoring discussed here. See supra Section II.C. There may be efficiency advantages to some forms of private
monitoring. Cf. Emily S. Bremer, Private Complements to Public Governance, 81 MO. L. REV. 1115,
1117 (2016) (discussing the institutional tradeoffs between private and public governance). Another issue is whether the FTC’s ability to collect information from time to time covers on-site
examinations of platforms. Assuming that it does not, a remote monitoring program would also
help the agency determine whether to request such authority.
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extent to which personal, rather than purely business, information is
needed to determine compliance with a given law.343 These and many
other platform governance features have been explored elsewhere.344
The necessity of working out further details about the shape and
scope of FTC monitoring, and political pressures weighing against FTC
assertiveness,345 should not obscure a more fundamental point. There
is a strong basis for concluding that the FTC already has the mandate,
without new legislation, to build a substantial monitoring program.
Used as a complement to other tools, such as ex post litigation and
consumer complaints, monitoring could contribute to a more robust
oversight architecture for the most surprisingly unregulated entities in
the information age.
B. The FCC, EEOC, and State Regulators
Most of this Article has focused on online platforms, a regulatory
sphere most relevant to the FTC. But a variety of other companies can
leverage technologies to engage in “digital market manipulation.”346
The monitoring framework, and its emerging tension with surveillance,
thus implicates other regulators.
First, the FCC has extensive unused monitoring authority over
cable and telecommunications firms.347 Comcast, Verizon, AT&T, and
similar companies arguably have greater ability to surveil than does
Facebook, because they can access all transferred data.348 Cable and
telecommunication companies can also sell that data to third parties,
thus cashing in on the incredible revenues from “big data, the new
oil.”349 A policy norm that prioritizes individuals’ privacy over that of

343. See discussion supra note 289 and accompanying text.
344. See sources cited supra note 12; see also Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the
Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18 (2017); Tutt, supra note 121.
345. Congress has previously reduced the agency’s powers and funding in response to a period
of vigorous FTC enforcement. See, e.g., Hans, supra note 228, at 168. Those dynamics may make
its leaders hesitant to use their full remaining authority.
346. Calo, supra note 198, at 999; see also Shaun B. Spencer, The Problem of Online Manipulation, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3341653&download=yes [https://perma.cc/N438-YAJU].
347. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 387 n.111 (explaining the FCC’s originating authority).
348. Salome Viljoen, Facebook’s Surveillance is Nothing Compared with Comcast, AT&T and
Verizon, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/06/delete-facebook-live-us-still-share-data [https://perma.cc/R8PY-DSQS]. Thanks to recent legislative
reforms, internet providers have great freedom to collect, analyze, and share essentially all of the
browsing data that flows through them. S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
349. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 122, at 374.
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businesses would lend support to the FCC monitoring how these firms
handle such massive data access.
Additionally, the EEOC provides an example of an agency
operating beyond the technology sector. Its originating statute, the
1964 Civil Rights Act, granted the authority to systematically collect
salary data from employers about pay to identify racial, gender, or other
discriminatory pay practices.350 But the EEOC did not write rules to
collect such data systematically until 2012.351 Moreover, although the
agency now collects considerable data in a routine manner from large
companies nationwide, it devotes only a handful of employees to
analyzing such data, relying primarily on employee complaints to open
over ninety-nine percent of investigations.352 Granted, analyzing
systematic employment data raises difficult questions about causality
and poses the risk of false accusations.353 But given that the agency now
collects large amounts of data, many of the costs to privacy and
compliance have already been overcome. In light of the difficulty one
employee may have in ascertaining pay differences, discriminatory pay
seems to be an area in need of rigorous cost-benefit analysis to
determine whether it merits greater use of regulatory monitoring.
Finally, state and local regulators also undertake considerable
monitoring. City inspectors grade restaurants, and county authorities
oversee cable companies.354 State and local regulatory monitors have
limits because multinational companies’ wrongdoing, particularly when
data is involved, typically transcends local government borders. Also,
courts consistently allow federal crime agencies to access state
regulatory information.355 Still, in some instances it may make sense
for local regulatory authorities to monitor business activities, especially
in the absence of action by federal regulators. Indeed, it was a local
agency that initiated action in some of the biggest corporate
prosecutions in recent years, such as the Los Angeles city lawsuit
against Wells Fargo for creating fake accounts in customers’ names.356

350. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 709, 78 Stat. 241, 262–64.
351. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2018).
352. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2016 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 93 (2016), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Mar/FY-2016-CBP-PAR-508C.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NUM-SRP7].
353. For a discussion of the problem of big-data-driven disparate impact, and different ways
to address the problem, see Barocas & Selbst, supra note 290, at 719; see also Pauline T. Kim,
Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 194 (2017).
354. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 13, at 607–08.
355. See Mikos, supra note 18, at 105, 152 (showing that courts allow federal agencies to access
state regulatory information, albeit with Fifth Amendment and other limitations).
356. See, e.g., James Rufus Koren. Why L.A. City Atty. Mike Feuer Knew the Wells Fargo Scandal Was Going to Blow Up, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2016, at B1.
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And though the FTC has not audited Airbnb for racial discrimination
by hosts, the state of California Department of Fair Employment and
Housing has used its legal authority to conduct tests.357
It is difficult to know, from the outside, why any particular
agency leader may have opted not to monitor—or whether that
possibility was even considered. But regulators’ historical track record
gives little confidence that repeated decisions to refrain from
monitoring were made on the merits, and instead indicates that those
decisions may be explained by industry capture or institutional
inertia.358 Ideally, legislators and agency leaders would take a fresh
look at whether they should exercise regulatory monitoring—their
primary means for understanding businesses—wherever that tool
currently lies dormant.
C. Moving Monitoring Out of the Shadow of Surveillance
Whether the goal is to build a new technology meta-agency that
monitors platforms, to require Facebook and Twitter to submit realtime election advertising reports to the Federal Election Commission,
or for the FTC commissioners to use the authority they already have,
policymakers must undertake a normative and legal analysis about the
appropriate exercise of administrative information collection. That
inquiry is more difficult because regulatory monitoring is, as a matter
of law and popular imagination, part of the surveillance state.
In a world in which “everything has software,”359 large portions
of the regulatory state that collect information from businesses could
now be incorrectly seen as engaging in personal surveillance. Part of
the problem is the pervasive monolithic portrayal of government
information collection. Scholars and judges often describe both business
regulators and crime agencies as being engaged in surveillance.360 The
challenge with a close association between the two is that observers,
including Supreme Court Justices, frequently reference an Orwellian
1984 dystopia in their discussions of crime data surveillance.361 Indeed,
357. Voluntary Agreement at 16–17, Dep’t of Fair Emp. and Hous. of Calif. v. Airbnb, Inc.,
Nos. 574743-231889, 574743-231624, (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2017/06/04-19-17-Airbnb-DFEH-Agreement-Signed-DFEH-1-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/46UY-F4VP] (outlining terms of testing).
358. See supra Section III.B.1.
359. Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1688–89 (2016).
360. See sources cited supra note 21 and accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Orwell’s 1984 and a Fourth Amendment Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1819, 1832–33, 1870 (2017) (surveying frequent judicial and scholarly references to Orwell’s 1984); see also Richards, supra note 260, at 1934 (“From the Fourth
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concerns about a totalitarian state pervade broader advocacy for
privacy.362 Nor is the association with totalitarianism limited to crime
agencies—television commercials, op-eds, and social media depict
regulators such as the FTC, CFPB, and EEOC as “Big Brother.”363
These pervasive references to a single state scrutinizing our
lives likely carry weight with the public. Apple CEO Tim Cook even
appealed to such suspicions when the FBI attempted to gain access to
terrorism suspects’ phones following the shooting deaths of fourteen
people at a San Bernardino, California work party in 2016.364 In an open
letter, Cook warned that the FBI’s demands would “undermine the very
freedoms and liberty our government is meant to protect.”365 Cook went
on to state the implications of granting the FBI’s request:
The government could extend this breach of privacy and demand that Apple build
surveillance software to intercept your messages, access your health records or financial
data, track your location, or even access your phone’s microphone or camera without your
knowledge.366

Note that Cook’s message uses the singular term, “the government,” but
mentions health records and financial data—information collected by
business regulators—alongside video and sound recordings of personal
space, which are more relevant to crime agencies.367
It is also noteworthy that terrorist attacks are one of the
strongest justifications for surveillance.368 The CEO of a major
consumer company would appeal to consumers’ anxiety about privacy
to ward off a government agency obtaining information about terrorist
activities only if he—based, presumably, on the considerable research
Amendment to George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four . . . our law and culture are full of warnings
about state scrutiny of our lives.”).
362. Whitman, supra note 15, at 1153 (“It is the rare privacy advocate who resists citing Orwell
when describing these dangers.”).
363. See, e.g., Camille Olson, Big Brother Is Still Watching—and It Doesn’t Know Why, HILL
(Sept. 28, 2016, 11:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/labor/298203-big-brother-is-stillwatching-and-it-doesnt-know-why [https://perma.cc/PAE5-HS47] (critiquing the EEOC’s salarydata collection while making the observation that “Big Brother is still watching”); Rachel Witkowski & Rob Blackwell, Why that Orwellian Anti-CFPB Ad Could Backfire, AM. BANKER (Nov. 10,
2015, 8:45 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-that-orwellian-anti-cfpb-ad-couldbackfire [https://perma.cc/84EQ-DC3N]; discussion infra notes 374–375 and accompanying text
(comparing the FTC to Big Brother). Private entities are sometimes included in these metaphors,
which have expanded to portray myriad Little Brothers. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1397 (2001).
364. See Rozenshtein, supra note 326, at 102–03.
365. Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.apple.com/customer-letter [https://perma.cc/239E-XF2N].
366. Id.
367. See supra notes 189–206 and accompanying text.
368. Cf. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 729–30, 732 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (“After the September 11th attacks, Congress expanded the Government’s authority to obtain additional records.”).
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insights available to him about customers—believed that such rhetoric
persuades a substantial portion of the public. Indeed, despite those
salient government interests in obtaining access to suspected terrorists’
phones, about forty-five percent of people supported Apple’s refusal to
help the FBI.369
It is difficult to know the impact of these blurred lines on
regulatory monitoring policy. But the muddling of the concept of state
surveillance may enable political actors with a deregulatory agenda to
leverage privacy concerns on a broader basis. For instance, when Mick
Mulvaney became the interim director of the CFPB in 2017, one of his
first moves was to freeze a significant amount of information collection
out of concerns that the CFPB could endanger consumers’ privacy.370
The effect of the data collection freeze was to significantly hinder the
agency’s core regulatory activities.371
To be clear, Mulvaney may have been responding to the
legitimate privacy concerns that exist whenever an agency collects
personal information, and did reinstate some information collection
processes after the Inspector General found that the CFPB had not
endangered consumers’ privacy.372 But Mulvaney was a strong
opponent of the CFPB. He had previously called the agency a “sick, sad”
joke, had introduced legislation to terminate the CFPB in his previous
role as a congressman, and, even after being appointed interim director,
continued to reiterate that the agency should not exist.373 Regardless of
Mulvaney’s motives in freezing data collection, the incident highlights
the potential tension between regulation and privacy.
Additional signs suggest regulators are wary that monitoring
will make them vulnerable to being publicly associated with
surveillance. For instance, in 2009 the FTC called for online endorsers

369. CBS News Poll: Americans Split on Unlocking San Bernardino Shooter’s iPhone, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 18, 2016, 8:24 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-news-poll-americans-split-onunlocking-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone [https://perma.cc/77VS-3ZLJ].
370. John Heltman, Warren Grills CFPB Head Over Data Collection Freeze, AM. BANKER, (Jan.
8, 2018, 3:09 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/warren-grills-cfpb-head-over-data-collection-freeze [https://perma.cc/D8EP-TQZ2].
371. Id.
372. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 2018 AUDIT OF THE BUREAU’S INFORMATION SECURITY
PROGRAM 1 (2018), https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/bureau-information-security-programoct2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/E57W-24GU].
373. See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy: Who Should Do
What?, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1117, 1140 (2019); Kelsey Ramirez, CFPB
Acting Director Mulvaney Says He Still Believes Bureau Shouldn’t Exist, HOUSINGWIRE (Apr. 11,
2018), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/43077-cfpb-acting-director-mulvaney-says-he-stillbelieves-bureau-shouldnt-exist [https://perma.cc/V7RS-EJ9J].
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of products to disclose any gifts or payments they received.374 Following
online commentaries comparing the agency to Big Brother, an FTC
official issued a statement saying, “We are not going to be patrolling the
blogosphere.”375 Given that public perception has historically played an
important role in driving Congress to authorize monitoring,376 a core
enforcement activity could face additional obstacles in the surveillance
era.
Greater clarity in discussing and analyzing regulatory
monitoring is thus important for regulating businesses in the
surveillance era. This Article has highlighted, at a top level, two main
sources of confusion. The first is the question about which agency is
acting, with the most important challenge being the conflation of crime
and regulatory agencies. The second is the type of information sought,
especially whether it is business or personal.377 These distinctions
complement existing efforts to move toward more accountable and
transparent algorithms.378
A few further preliminary observations on this basic taxonomy
and its application are in order. One of its main functions is to facilitate
a more refined normative analysis. Each type of information collection
would still be weighed in terms of the traditional normative factors,
such as information asymmetries.379 Within that analysis, however, the
regular collection of business information, without any personal data,
would face a lower privacy barrier than would the other categories.
It bears emphasis that neither a taxonomy nor a normative
framework for exercising information collection should hew too closely
to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. To be sure, a real-world state
privacy hierarchy would ideally reflect the constitutional prioritization
of personal over business privacy.380 But the Fourth Amendment allows
agencies to subpoena even sensitive personal records, such as bank
374. FTC Reassures Bloggers—Big Brother Isn’t Watching, BLOG LEGALTIMES (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/10/ftc-.html [https://perma.cc/7F9P-2WMS].
375. Id.
376. See supra Section I.B.
377. Cf. Slobogin, supra note 257, at 841 (drawing on Fifth Amendment cases to conclude that
in subpoena law “the distinction between personal and impersonal records is a crucial one”).
378. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 12, at 18; Desai & Kroll, supra note 12, at 6–23;
David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 655 (2017); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The
Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2018). The project of
ensuring governmental algorithms are transparent and accountable is a separate but related project. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019); Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503,
1563–64.
379. See supra Part I.
380. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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account statements, held by businesses—and confusingly calls them
“business records.”381 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence thus has little
to offer from a prescriptive standpoint or in terms of linguistic precision.
What would it mean to write laws with this privacy hierarchy in
mind? A prominent legislative example of a failure to differentiate
regulatory monitoring from crime surveillance comes from what has
been called the constitution of the administrative state: the APA.
Section 555(c) of the APA specifies that any “requirement of a report,
inspection, or other investigative act or demand may not be issued,
made, or enforced except as authorized by law.”382 Drafters intended the
APA to govern both crime agencies and regulators,383 and the official
legislative notes on section 555 show that they wanted to address
personal privacy.384 Given that personal privacy is violated mostly by
crime agencies associated with the Fourth Amendment and government
overreach,385 lawmakers drafting a statute covering all agencies would
understandably err on the side of constraints.
Despite being drafted with a goal of constraining crime agencies’
information collection, the APA is rarely applied to crime agencies.386
Thus, through the APA lawmakers imposed an additional hurdle for
regulatory monitoring that did not exist for crime agencies. Although in
court the APA has not posed a significant obstacle to the FTC and other
regulators’ exercise of monitoring,387 agencies decide on courses of
action to minimize the chance of being judicially overturned.388 By
381. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) (finding no privacy exception for financial records).
382. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (2012).
383. Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 60 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting “the existence of the
APA as a means for reviewing the FBI’s actions”); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal
Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REV. 703, 708 (1974) (explaining drafters’ intent for the APA to
apply to crime agencies).
384. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, pt. 4, at 264 (1946) (“Investigations may not disturb or disrupt
personal privacy . . . .”).
385. See supra Section III.B.1.
386. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 989 (2006) (“[U]nlike the administrative law context, where agencies must adhere to the structural and procedural protections of the Administrative Procedure Act and their decisions are subject to judicial review and political oversight, the government faces almost no institutional checks
when it proceeds in criminal matters.”); Slobogin, supra note 14, at 122 (“The fact that police are
exempt [from administrative law] appears to be an inadvertent byproduct of judicial constitutional
activism and our federalist structure rather than a considered policy development.”).
387. See supra Section IV.A (reviewing judicial authorization of FTC monitoring).
388. Although agency avoidance of potential review is difficult to document, it often inferred
in the literature. See, e.g., Mendelson & Wiener, supra note 322, at 472 (discussing common assumptions that agencies avoid OIRA review and describing the difficulty in knowing diverse
agency responses); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1755, 1756–57 (2013) (describing agencies’ reluctance to have their decisions overturned by
courts).
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failing to differentiate the information collection nuances of the
administrative state, lawmakers may have, through the APA,
inadvertently had a chilling effect on business regulators regarding
information collection.
The information default in administrative statutes such as the
APA would ideally reflect the different privacy implications and
historical tendencies of the specific type of agency. The APA might, for
instance, be amended to change its default rule to allow a regulator to
collect information from businesses necessary to carry out its mission.
Congress could then limit that default for any given agency or in
particular contexts, such as through the Paperwork Reduction Act.389
Indeed, the APA may be best interpreted as allowing broad regulatory
monitoring as long as an agency’s organic statute mentions basic
information collection authority—since that is how crime agencies’
authority has been interpreted.390
In designing monitoring statutes, there would be further value
in adjusting for the type of information collected. Lawmakers and
judges might, for instance, give less weight to the business owners’
interests in withholding anonymized personal data from regulators if
that business is already routinely sharing similar nonanonymized data
with crime agencies. Crime agencies would, in a sense, provide a floor
for what business regulators could collect. More important than any
particular reform, a reoriented normative framework for monitoring
should more explicitly fit each type of information collection, rather
than subsuming regulatory monitoring into the constraint-oriented
crime surveillance framework.
None of this speaks to valid concerns about business regulators
taking adequate precautions with any data collected, including passing
information on to crime agencies391 Information-sharing concerns are
relevant to the question of deciding whether to support a monitoring
proposal because policymakers, scholars, and the public must have
confidence in advance that appropriate safeguards are possible. In
addition to the existing constraints discussed above, one layer of
additional protection would be statutorily prohibiting the regulator
from collecting personal data, such as accessing the contents of Gmail

389. See supra note 320 and accompanying text (discussing the Paperwork Reduction Act).
390. See supra notes 325–327 and accompanying text.
391. A tradeoff exists between performance and engineering standards. Performance standards are broader guidelines and best practices that are harder to monitor but provide more flexibility in identifying wrongdoing. Engineering standards are more precise, facilitating both compliance by the business and monitoring by the regulator, but allow less flexibility to police new harms.
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, The Law of the Test: Performance-Based Regulation
and Diesel Emissions Control, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 33, 39 (2017).
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messages, except where necessary for the nature of the law.392 Instead,
the regulator may be allowed to collect information about Google’s
policies, such as how its algorithms analyze, store, and share those
emails, and perhaps the anonymized consumer complaints that Google
has received.393
Another layer of protection for individuals’ privacy would come
from mandating firewalls for sharing information both within the
agency and externally. Banking regulators provide one such model, in
which examiners closely safeguard the raw data they collect.394 The
Office of the Inspector General could then ensure that regulators are
following mandated data security precautions, as it did with the
CFPB.395 Although business regulators are already hesitant to collect
sensitive information and reluctant to share it, these limits built into
legislation would limit risks further.396
Once it is recognized that regulators can collect valuable
information from businesses without undermining privacy, the issue of
monitoring platforms can be analyzed more rigorously. Empirical work
on the cost-benefit analysis of monitoring, including a comparison to ex
post fines, would advance that project considerably. A crucial initial
step is to weigh the tradeoffs on their merits, rather than dismiss
monitoring out of a fear that collecting data from Amazon, Google,
Facebook, or other businesses is a step on the path to totalitarianism.
CONCLUSION
Although the linkage between regulatory monitoring and
personal surveillance is inevitable, these two administrative
mechanisms need greater distinction and coherence. If information is
the lifeblood of good governance, an increasingly muddled monitoring

392. See supra Section II.C.2 (discussing monitoring design and effectiveness). Some privacy
statutes already make this distinction, albeit imperfectly. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012) (restricting access to the contents of personal emails). Some protections, such as for discrimination
based on names identified with race, may require personally identifiable information to be collected. In those cases, the purpose and nature of the information would be spelled out by statute,
and the need to protect the victims should be balanced against those victims’ privacy interests.
393. All that data either implicates no individual user or could be anonymized before being
handed over to the government.
394. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2012) (“It is the policy of the Congress
that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy
of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal information.”); Drake Mann, Christopher L. Travis & Don Lloyd Cook, Data Security and
Privacy: More Than I.T., 50 ARK. LAW. 14, 15 (2015) (“[T]he banking sector may have the most
mature regulation of all information security regulatory regimes.”).
395. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 372, at 1 (2018).
396. See supra notes 283 to 285 and accompanying text.
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framework constricts a key artery of the administrative state. Privacy,
as it is currently understood and advocated, offers a pretext for
deregulation.
Nowhere is state information incoherence starker than in the
nonmonitoring of the platform economy. The very firms that have
enabled the state to circumvent restrictive surveillance laws are
themselves unusually shielded from observation, even as many other
industries are required to provide troves of data for regulatory
examination. As a result, key regulators, most notably the FTC, do not
have the information needed to analyze arguably the most important
firms in the modern economy—the gatekeepers of information in the
information age. Paradoxically, more ongoing private information
collection by the government—in other words, activity that could easily
be confused with surveillance and often is—might in fact be necessary
to contain harmful surveillance of individuals.
Faced with an increasingly opaque and continually changing
business landscape, some of the most important administrative
agencies in the information age are sitting on dormant “power to get
information from those who best can give it and who are most interested
in not doing so.”397 Regulators would be better situated to exercise that
authority with monitoring moved out of the shadow of surveillance.

397. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950).

